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Abstract
Various modal logics seem well suited for developing models of knowledge, belief, time, change, causality, and other intensional concepts. Most such systems are
related to the classical Lewis systems, and thereby have a substantial body of conventional proof theoretical results. However, most the applied literature examines
modal logics from a semantical point of view, rather than through proof theory.
It appears arguments for validity are more clearly stated in terms of a semantical
explanation, rather than a classical proof-theoretic one. We feel this is due to the
inability of classical proof theories to adequately represent intensional aspects of
modal semantics. This thesis develops proof theoretical methods which explicitly
represent the underlying semantics of the modal formula in the proof. We initially
develop a Gentzen style proof system which contains semantic information in the
sequents. This system is, in turn, used to develop natural deduction proofs. Another semantic style proof representation, the modal expansion tree is developed.
This structure can be used to derive either Gentzen style or Natural Deduction
proofs. We then explore ways of automatically generating MET proofs, and prove
sound and complete heuristics for that procedure. These results can be extended to
most propositional system using a Kripke style semantics and a fist order theory
of the possible worlds relation. Examples are presented for standard T, S4, and
S5 systems, systems of knowledge and belief, and common knowledge. A computer

program which implements the theory is briefly examined in the appendix.
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1

Introduction

The field of Artificial Intelligence covers a broad interdisciplinary area of research
devoted to the goal of realizing, as computational constructions, those behaviors and
performances typically associated with human intelligence. As such, it represents
the intersection of work done by researchers in the areas of philosophy, computer
science, mathematics, and psychology to name a few.
One particular set of people in the A1 community have embraced logic as a
language which can be used to model the cognitive processes of intelligent agents at
some level of description. Initially, propositional and first order logic were used to
model small deterministic situations which could be completely described by some
set of axioms. However, philosophers are quick to point out that many human
behaviors are intensional; and that first order languages tend to be ill-suited to
expressing intensional concepts. Some more powerful system should be used.
One can consider two ways of extending first order logic to more powerful systems. One can allow variables and substitution to range over predicates and formula,
yielding higher order logic; or one can enhance the language with more logical operators, yielding modal logic. It is to modal logic that most A1 researchers turn when
attempting to devise formal systems encompassing intensional concepts.
What does it mean for a system of logic to "model" some concept or concepts.
At the very least, we would expect that the sentences which are derivable seem to
express the proper (intuitive) relationships among the members of the domain of
discourse. Alternatively, if we have a sound and complete theory, we can replace
"derivable" by "validn. In this case, we have two competing methods of studying a
system of logic. We can construct arguments for sentences from axioms by syntactic
methods, or examine them analytically by semantic met hods.
Formal analytic methods date back to the development of sequential methods by
Gentzen [6]. In the first order systems, the edensional nature of the language makes
it possible to develop an analytic proof theory which stands in exact correspondence
to the underlying semantics. However, when we turn to modal languages, analytic
methods suffer from the non-eztensional nature of the language. An analytic proof
theory strictly couched in a modal language can never express analytic arguments

as a first order language would.
The purpose of this thesis is to develop, by modification of the notion of modal
proof, an analytic proof theory somewhat after the style of Gentzen [6]. From
this logical basis, we develop computational methods of deduction suitable for both
interactive and automatic generation of proofs. This allows the use of the computer
as a tool for the study of systems of modal logic - a possibility which seems to have
been largely ignored to this point.

1.1 Background and Motivation
Are semantical arguments for validity really useful? That is, do we really need
explanations (in the form of proofs) which justify the validity of sentences in an
analytic way. There is, of course, no firm answer to a question such as this. On the
other hand, a cursory look at some of the uses of modal logic in A1 may lend weight
to the hypothesis that semantical arguments are useful and should be studied.
From an A1 perspective, probably two of the major turning points in the philosophy of modal logics were the development of model theory by Kripke[l4], and
Hintikka's work

[lo] on knowledge and belief.

The former put modal logic on firm

mathematical grounds as a type of logistic system. The latter work set forth systems closely related to the classical S4 and 5 5 systems with modal operators which
could be interpreted as "agent a knows that p" and "agent a believes that pn, thus
bringing modal systems to the attention of A1 researchers.
From a philosophical point of view, there are several shortcomings with that
particular formulation of knowledge and belief. However, it was a starting point for
later work by Sato[28]. Based on diicussions with John McCarthy, he formalized
various extensions to classical modal systems to formalize concepts of knowledge,
introspection, and common knowledge (281 as problems in AI. As an example, he
showed how the problem of three wise men could be presented using modal logic. It
is interesting to note that he also develops a sequent calculus for his modal systems.
However, the proof of the wisemen problem is presented .semantically; and, the
formal proof is presented almost as an afterthought.
At about this same time, McCarthy and Hayes[17], in a series of articles on

formalized action paradigms, suggested it might be possible to use modal logics (in
particular a semantic interpretation of them), as a language for expressing action.
Moore [22] did just this by combining both the modal logic of knowledge based on
the possible world semantics of Kripke [14],and the situation calculus of McCarthy
and Hayes recast in terms of possible worlds. His approach uses a first-order formulation of modal logic semantics, thus allowing explicit reasoning about worlds,
within the formalism.
Some of the latest work in modal logic and A1 is due to Konolige [13]. He
formalizes a deduction model of belief for a family of first-order modal logics and
proves a form of Herbrand's theorem for these logics. This is crucially important
since, while decision procedures have existed for T, S4, and S5 [ll],there have
been no corresponding semi-decision procedures for quantified modal logics which
are amenable to automated theorem proving.
Another fertile area for the use of modal systems has been in temporal reasoning[l6]. Typically, futures and pasts are represented by linear or branching sets
of states, and the set of modal operators enhanced to cover all the possibilities of
future and past tenses. Thus, a modality can be interpreted, for instance, as saying
that "some condition holds in all states of some future" - essentially quantifying
existentially on branches, and universally on states within that branch. It seems
that semantic proofs in these logics offer a very coherent basis for natural language
explanations of temporal system behavior.
One theme which is common to this (quick and incomplete) review of literature
is the semantic viewpoint taken toward logic. One would expect, given the computational applications, that the work would have a more computational flavor; that
is, manipulation of syntax in a proof theoretical fashion. However, there are few
cases where classical modal proofs are even discussed. For instance, Moore circumvents the problem by translating to the first order domain, and Konolige presents
an entirely different semantics which is more amenable to computational methods.
There is, in fact, a substantial body of work in the proof theory of modal logics
[5,25,26,27,28,29],but, with the notable exception of tableau methods, little of that
work has impinged upon current research in applications of the logics. I would

suggest the reason why rests fundamentally on the fact that modal logics have an

intensional interpretation of predicates. Rather than being only strictly true or
false, predicates can occur within modalities and be subject to varying interpretations. To accomplish this, the semantics of the modal operators is formalized
using items not expressible in the language. This is, of course, where modal languages derive their unique characteristics. It is possible for the modal operators
to express fairly abstract concepts and rely on the underlying semantics to supply
proper interpret ation.
On the other hand, the gap between the syntax and semantics tends to make
purely axiomatic arguments for validity somewhat obscure. This is one reason why,
even with the availability of abundant proof theory for modal logics, one more often
sees semantical arguments for validity offered. e.g. [22,28]. Another problem with
strictly axiomatic and in general most proof theoretic systems is that it is difficult
to compare modal systems; even those with the same syntax. McCarthy and Hayes
[17] make this point, and suggest that systems which explicitly account for the
semantics of the logic allow both classification of various systems and "intelligible
interpretation for modal predicate calculi."
As mentioned above, very little has been done in the realm of applying computational methods to modal logic. Contrast this with first order languages where
the computer is an invaluable aid in generating proofs and refutations. Resolution methods have provided a fertile ground for implementations which are based
on logical systems. The funda'mental basis for most of this work is some form of

Herbrand's Theorem.
One of the problems with applying standard proof theoretical tools to theorem
proving in modal logic has been the lack of a Herbrand type of result (with the
previously cited exception of Konolige). Herbrand's theorem fundamentally rests
on the notion of substitution of elements from the domain of discourse yielding a
tautologous form of the formula. However, since the underlying semantics of modal
systems is nontruth-functional, it is difficult to derive an analog to Herbrand's
Theorem. Hence, most automated theorem proving techniques cannot be used in a
straightforward fashion.

One way to circumvent this problem is to consider translating modal statements
into some first order language and carrying out the proof in that language. Morgan
[24] discusses two approaches for applying standard theorem proving technology
to non-classical (specifically modal and intuitionistic) logics. The first approach
involves embedding the entire axiomatic system of the object language into a metalanguage based on first order logic. Axioms and inference rules of the object language appear explicitly in the meta language. This allows for easy translation of
proofs of object language statements in the meta language to proofs in the object
language. No knowledge of the semantics of the object language is required.
This approach suffers from extreme inefficiency from a computational point of
view. We are essentially running an interpreter for one nondeterministic system
using another nondeterministic (and perhaps undecidable) system! Last and most
important, the approach works only for propositiorurl logics; the extensions to first
order logic are far from trivial.
The second approach (similar to the one we are taking) translates the formula
into first order logic and proceeds with the proof in that system. Morgan [24] and
Haspel [9] develop and prove the correctness of proof methods based on a semantic
translation of modal statements into first order predicate calculus. Based on this,
we know that first order languages are strong enough to express semantical proofs
of most modal logics.
The interested reader may wish to examine a version of this approach presented
in Moore[22,23]. This method essentially builds an "interpretern for modal logic
in first order logic. A number of axioms are specified for the translation of modal
statements into their first order equivalents, and an axiomitization of the semantics
of modal logic is used to derive conclusions. He notes the translation axioms can be
procedurally interpreted as they are only syntactic rewrites, and proofs which outline a semantical argument for truth are presented. The advantage of this approach
is that the reasoning about worlds is very explicit, and it allows a fairly intuitive
coalescing of knowledge and action by referring to "statesn of knowledge and taking
a state space approach to action.

2.

'Moore's formulation also deals with identity and quantification which makes the system much

5

In summary, it appears there are at least two reasons to undertake the study of
a form of proof theory which explicitly accounts for the semantics underlying the
validity of a statement. First, the best explanations for statements in a theory are
often semantical. Secondly, it is conceivable that a proof theory of this form would
be more amenable to implementation on a computer.
The theory presented herein addresses both of these issues. It is proof theoretical
in that it is applicable to the syntax of the logic; but, it has more correspondence
to semantics in that the proofs mirror semantic arguments by showing the actual
model structure being developed. In this thesis we develop both the proof theory,
and computational methods of deduction for a set of such a systems. The languages
we cover will all be propositional modal logics with Kripke style semantics. The
restriction to the propositional case is due to merely time and space constraints is
not indicative of any known inherent limitations of the method.

1.2

Overview of the Thesis

In the next section of this thesis we review the standard definitions for modal logic.
We then provide a definition of the syntax in which proof statements will be writ ten,
and supply an interpretation for those formulas. Since we will study a variety of
logics in this thesis, we present the syntax and semantics in a general fashion and
customize the language and interpretations to each of our examples as needed.
The third section presents a modified sequent calculus for constructing semantical proofs in modal logics having a Kripke type semantics. In the interests of
extensibility, the system is presented as a base collection, and operational inference
figures for the additional modal operators are added as needed. Information about
the possible worlds relation is explicitly represented in the sequents, and the introduction rules for the modalities modify this information. Proofs of soundness
and completeness are given for the standard T, 5 4 , and S5 logics. The system
is extended to handle multiple knowers and common knowledge. The Wise Man
puzzle as it appears in [28] is presented as a example of the style of proofs using
-

-

-

-

more complicated. In the propositional case, his approach and ours are essentially the same,
though our goals are somewhat divergent.

this formalization.
The next section presents linear natural deduction proofs after the fashion of
Miller [18,19,20]. These proofs are much more amenable to machine implementation
than the Gentzen proofs upon which they are based, yet capture the same semantic
flavor as the sequent calculus. They can be viewed as Suppes style proofs which
are "linearizationn of the sequent system established in the previous section. The
presentation will be based on a proof outline. Several outline transformations will
process outlines until a completed proof is achieved. Correctness of these transformations will be based on the Gentzen system. As a result, the proof of correctness
gives a simple algorithm for constructing a Gentzen proof corresponding to the
natural deduction proof.
Following this, we develop the notion of proof representations for modal statements. In particular, we adopt the expunsion tree as a basic proof representation
and modify it to suit our languages. Expansion trees and their modal analogs have
many desirable properties as a compact and clean proof representation. As an example, we will demonstrate how sequential and natural deduction proofs can be
constructed from expansion tree proofs.
One can view the search for an expansion tree proof in two stages. First, construct the "scaffoldingn of the tree, then search for the appropriate substitution
instances of a formula which make the deep structure of the tree tautologous. One
way of searching for these substitution instances is to use the method of matings
[1,2]. We will examine some of the issues involved in this proof process. In particular, we will show that substantial speedup can be achieved by suitably structuring
the search. These results also suggest that it is possible to view the search for a proof
as interaction between a standard theorem prover, and attached procedures. There

are several issues of control in this view; with standard tableau systems appearing
as a point on the spectrum.

Finally, we will describe implemented systems for finding expansion trees, and
editing natural deduction proofs based on the above theory. Nearly all examples
presented in the thesis were run on or generated by these systems. In the appendix
we present some Prolog code corresponding to the mathematical definitions in order

to clarify the connections between the formalism and its implementation.

It is assumed the reader is familiar with standard first order logic, and has
had some exposure to modal logic and higher order logic. Knowledge of Gentzen
systems and natural deduction proofs is essential, as well as a basic understanding
of automated theorem proving. Familiarity with the language Prolog is useful, but
not essential.

Syntax and Semantics

2

This section gives a general account of some modal systems of logic - that is, logics
with an extended set of operators. Since we will study a number of languages,
our definitions of syntax will be for languages with some set of modal operators.
Similarly, our definitions of semantics will be general enough to account for this
class of languages.
We will in fact supply two definitions of syntax. The first is the standard definition of a modal language. This, in our case, is what might be termed the outer
syntax. It is the syntax of the language under study. On the other hand, our proof
system will have a special syntax, the inner syntax - the language in which proofs
are carried out. Our definition of "proof" in the next section will make the connection between statements of the outer language, and proofs of those statments
couched in the inner language.

2.1

Definition of the Outer Language

The syntax for modal languages is the normal set of well formed formulae of the
propositional calculus closed under both the standard rules of formation, and rules
for the modal operator symbols. Following [4], we will adopt the convention of
referring to some sequence of modalities and negations containing an even number of
negations as afirmative, and an odd number as negative. Often, a modal language
contains modalities which are dual to each other - that is, either operator can
be defined as an affirmative occurence of the other. In order to generalize the
presentation, we will consider the set R to be some set of modal operator symbols,
and some subset of their duals,

n, will

be introduced by definition if they are

required.

In the sequel, we will take the liberty of using the symbol XK as a schema to
be uniformly replaced by A or V wherever it occurs; and, similarly, Q will stand
for V or 3 whichever being appropriate from context. Also, more recent literature
has replaced L and M by the symbols

and

0

respectively. In this thesis we will

continue to use L and M with their classical interpretations. Lastly, we will let

characters at the beginning of the greek alphabet (a, /3, ...) denote formulas in the
outer syntax, and characters toward the end (+, a,...) as formulas in the inner
syntax.

Definition 2.1 Let ll be a set of propositional atoms, and R be a (possibly empty)
set of modal operators. P, the set of well-formed propositions, is the smallest set
containing ll and closed under the following rules of formation:
if

a!

is a wff, then

-

a!

is a wff

if a and /? are a wffs, then aMO(P is a wff
if a is a wff, then pa is a wfF for all p E R.
We will often enrich our syntax by defining the symbol > and a set of symbols,
$2,

which represent the duals of the operators in R.

Definition 2.2

4f

For each w E $2, w a --p

-

a!

for someunique p E

R.

In this formulation, we can define the system for a single modal operator by
letting
to

n.

R

= {L) and $2 = 0, or get standard syntax for T (S4 or 55) by adding M

The systems of knowledge [8,13,22] consider a number of modalities, Ki or

Si representing the knowledge or beliefs of agents in the system. We can arrive at
modal logic of knowledge by letting R = {Kl,.

..,K,)

and

$2 = 0

Now that we have a syntax, we need to supply an interpretation to give content
to the system. There is a fairly uniform semantics which, with only minor variations,
covers all systems of modal logic we will discuss. The formulation we will present
initially is the standard account such as is found in [4,11,12]. This is not the
only possible semantical account for modal logics. For instance, Halpern [7] has
given an alternate semantics which is also sound and complete with respect to a
modal language used to model knowledge, and Konolige[l3] formalizes yet another
interpretation which is equivalent to Kripke semantics under certain restrictions.
At this point, however, we will consider only Kripke type semantics.

The basic notion in Kripke semantics is a world (sometimes referred to as a state
in the propositional case). A world is an assignment of truth valuation to atomic
symbols, or alternatively a set of propositions. Thus, the semantics of propositions
under modal operators is not directly truth-functional - a statement in the language
may be true or false depending on the particular world we choose to look at.
Worlds are related by an accessibility relation. This accessibility relation is used
to give an interpretation for the modal operators. The interpretation of a modality
can often be thought of as quantifying universally or existentially over related worlds.
We will refer to modalities with the former interpretation as universal modalities,
and the latter as existential modalities.

Definition 2.3 A model, M, is a tuple (W, V, Rp, ,..., Rp, ) where
W is a set of worlds,

V is a valuation function V : II x W

H

(0,I), and

Rpi for any pi E R is a binary relation on worlds in W, i.e. Rpi C W x W.
Given this structure, we can define an interpretation for a modal formula.

Definition 2.4 A formula, a, is true in a model, M, and a world, wi E W (denoted
(M,wi) a) iff:

+

(Mywi) k p iff V(p,wi) = 1 if p € R,
(M, wi)

k-

iff not (M, toi)

ka

for any universal p E R, (M, toi)
(M,wj) k a
for any existential p E R , (M, wi)
and (M,wj)
a

+

pa iff for all wj such that wiRPwj,
pa iff there is some wj such that wiRPwj,

Definition 2.5 A formula, a, is true in a model (denoted M
every world in that model.

a) iff it is true at

Definition 2.6 A formula a is x-valid for some system of modal logic x (denoted
a) iff it is true in all models of the class conforming to the restrictions of system
x.

+,

Different systems of modal logic can be defined over the same language by modifying the class of models under consideration. For instance, having no restrictions
yields a basic system (sometimes called K, not to be confused with the system K
in the thesis) which is the smallest system one can consider. Any system which
contains K is called a normal system. T, S4, and S5 are normal systems which
restrict the relation, RL , be reflexive, reflexive and transitive, or an equivalence
respectively.

2.2

All of the system we will present are normal systems.

Definition of the Inner Language

In the previous subsection, we defined validity, in standard fashion, as satisfaction
ranging over all models and all worlds in that model. This is not the only possible definition. In his original work, Kripke defined a normal model to be a triple

(H,W, R) where W is a set of worlds, R is a relation, and H is some arbitrary mem-ber of W. The interpretation function then uses H as the originating member in
the world relation.
As one would expect, Kripke's definition of validity implies the one we have
given above. If a formula is satisfied in a model from some arbitrary world, then
by universal generalization, it is true in all worlds. Notice, then, that the truth of
some formula in a world depends only on the subformula of that formula, and the
worlds related to that originating world. This is formalIy expressed by defining the
notion of a generated model[4]. We say a model MUis generated from M by w if
M w is a restriction of M to the worlds related to w. The particular result we are
interested in is:

Proposition 2.1 Let M be a model. Then:

M

k A iff for every w E M, MWk

A

In other words, the generated portion of a model suffices as a test of the truth
of a formula in a model. For purposes of validity, then, we need only focus our
SNearly all work in A1 has been done using variants of the systems mentioned above. There are
several other restrictions possible on R (e.g. Euclidean or Serial) which we will neglect. Most
results presented in this thesis generalize to those variants.

attention on the class of generated models.

'

This view of semantics seems to lend itself toward an analytical style of analysis.

If one were analyzing the semantical content of a formula, one would pick some
arbitrary world from which to start. One would then examine the model generated
by the sentence to determine truth or falsity. This is, in fact, the basis for most
refutation-based semantic tableau theorem provers.

In order to construct an analytic proof theory in this style, we must be able to
represent the intermediate stages of the proof. This is not (directly) possible in the
standard syntax because propositions are not strictly eztensional. Modal languages
are not extensional simply because the truth valuation of a proposition depends on
both its subformula, and the possible world it occurs in, as can be clearly seen in
Definition 2.4. We intend to develop a proof structure which is closely related to the
semantics of the formulae, so we must tailor that structure to be more nearly truthfunctional. Obviously, the way to do this is to develop some way of representing
the possible-worlds relation.

In our proof systems, we will ornament formulae with a world term denoting the
world or set of worlds in which the subformula is to be interpreted, e.g. (aV P)wa.
The proof will proceed by generating a model based on the sentence. At all points,
the ornamentation on the formula, and a set of relation constraints will encode the
current frame of the proof. Validity will be ensured by selecting a special arbitrary
initial world term which appears nowhere else in the proof and appealing to universal
generalization over the class of models generated from that term.
The following definitions formalize the notion of ornamented formulas, which
we will sometimes call the inner syntax. The standard definition of modal formulas
will be called the outer syntax.

Definition 2.7 Let H = {wo, wl, ...), be a set of world variables.
Let II be a set of propositional atoms, and R be a (possibly empty) set of modal
operators. PI, the set of well-formed inner propositions, is the smallest set closed
under the following rules of formation:
{(a),la E II and w E B) 2 PI,
*For more discussion on generated model, the interested reader should consult [4].

if (a), is a wff, then (N a), is a wff
if (a), and 3/, are a wffs, then ( ~ x K P )is, a wff
if (a), is a wff, then (pa), is a wff for all p E R.
This is simply a restatement of Definition 2.1 so that all well-formed formulas
are ornamented with a world term. However, here we have an explicit representation for possible worlds. This requires semantic modifications to account for an
interpretation of the world variables and the possible worlds relation. We will do
this in the obvious way, by interpreting the modal formulae under a substitution of
elements of the possible worlds domain for the world variables.
Our proof systems will be sequent systems similar to those developed by [6].
However, we will augment the sequent with a representation for constraints on the
reIationship among the possible worlds variables. That is, sequents in this system
are to be of the form
R;C

+0

where C and O are sets of ornamented modal formulae, and R contains statements
of the form: wi R, w j . These latter statements encode the current conditions on
the possible worlds relation for the various modal operators ( p in this case) in the
language. Our notion of substitution will have to account for these constraints.

Definition 2.8 Define a substitution as a mapping, s, from elements of H to elements of the possible worlds domain, W, of a model, i.e.

Moreover, we will call a substitution proper with respect to some set of statements6
{ w j RPiw ~ . . . if,
) for all such statements,

A proper substitution, then, is a mapping of the possible world ornamentations
to the possible worlds of a model such that the relational constraints are met. By
using the above definition, we offer the following interpretation for our extended
sequents:
6Note we denote syntas by w Rp wt and write this actual relation in a model as ( w , w t ) E
avoid confusion.
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Rp to

Definition 2.9 Let r and A be possibly empty sets of inner formulas. We say M
is a model for a sequent R; I' + A, written

if, for every R-proper substitution s, we have
(M,s(w))

a for some (a), E I' or (M,s(w))

p for some (P),

E A

3

A Gentzen-style System for Modal Logic

In this section we will present several flavors of a sequent system, LKM, for modal
logic after the style of Gentzen [6]. In section 2, we introduced a notation which
allows us to specify the possible worlds information needed to interpret modal statements. Recall our convention is the expression (A), is interpreted to mean: "The
formula A is true in the world denoted by w" , and our sequents contained statments
which denoted the relationships between possible worlds.
Inference rules in a sequent system are typically taken to be introduction rules for
each logical connective in the language. In order to generalize our treatment, we will
define a base collection of rules for LKM which correspond to the standard complete
set of operational inference figures for non-modal calculus. For any modal language
with some operator set R, we will add an antecedent and a succedent introduction
rule for every p E R . By symmetry, every w E fl will use the introduction rules of it's
corresponding member in R, but with the side of the occurrence reversed (i.e. the
succedent rules become antecedent rules and vice-versa). By adding these inference
figures to the base collection to get particularizations of LKM to the syntax under
study.
As a proof proceeds, certain introduction rules will modify the "topologyn of
the possible worlds relation by adding constraints to 8. Other introduction rules
will use the information in

R as a proviso on their applicability. The restrictions of

this proviso allow us to specialize a particular instantiation of LKM to some class
of models. At the end of the proof, ?R gives the essential structure of the possible
worlds relation which forces validity.

In the sequel, we will adopt the convention of denoting different instances of
LKM by a subscript naming the logistic system in use, e.g. LKM,*, or LKMS5.
The subscripts will be one of T, S4, S5, K (knowledge), or 0 (common knowledge).
Also, we will denote the derivability of an endsequent of the form
a system x by I-,
by F H

0;

--+

(a),in

a, and the derivability of a proposition in a Hilbert system

. Furthermore,

we will use the symbol I-" to denote derivability in the

(usually first order) theory of possible worlds relations for a system of modal logic,

x. For example, ES4denotes derivability in a theory of reflexive, transitive, binary

relations.

3.1

The Basic System LKM

Let A, C , and P be propositional formulas, and let I?, A, Q and A represent possibly
empty, finite lists of formulae. The following are the base inference rules for our
modal derivation system, LKM.

Definition 3.1 (The Base Collection of Inference Figures) The base collection of
inference figures is:
8;I' + Q
%;I' + 0
thinning
thinning
8
;
r
3
O,
(A),
8 ; @),,I'
Q
+

x;(A)w,(A)w,r
8 ; (A),,r

+

--+Q

8 ; A, ( A ) ~ I(,C ) W ~ , I' '

-

R ; A , ( c ) w ~ , ( A ) w i , r -'
%;r

%;I' 4 Q,(A)w,(A)w
contraction
%;I' + @,(A),

Q

8 ;r
interchange
8 ;r

Q

Q

Q, (A),

-'

R;(A),,I'

+

-3

Q

+

8;r

+

4

@,(A),

Q , ( A V C),

-+

A

cut

@,A

R;(c),,I'

A-IA

A-IS

+Q

R;(AAC),,I'
~;c,,I'

Q

R;(AVC),,I'

8;I'

Q, (C)W2, ( A ) w ~A,

---, @,(AAC),

~ ; ( A A c ) , , ~+ Q
R;(A),,I'

Q, (A),I, (CIw2,A

R;I' + Q, ( c ) ~

@,(A),
%;I'

--+

R;(A),,A

8;I',A
%;I'

--+

contraction

v-IS

+

-+

+

Q

A-IA
Q

V-IA

Q

8;r + Q, (c),
8;r + Q, (A v C),

v-IS

interchange

Axioms in this system are of the form:

A proof in this system will be a tree with the sequent 0; + (A), at the root, and
axioms at the leaves. We will say this is a proof for the modal statement A.

Proposition 3.1 (Soundness and Completeness of the Base Collection) There is an
L K M proof for a if and only if a is tautologous.
Notice that any proof in LK could be converted to a proof in L K M merely by
adding a w E B ornamentation to all formulae in all sequents, and the converse.
Hence, LK and L K M proofs are equivalent, and, by soundness and completeness
of LK for propositional logic, L K M is also sound and complete.

Corollary 3.2 Propositional calculus is contained in all modal systems discussed
in this thesis.

3.2

The Systems T , S4, and S5

Most classical modal languages have a single modal operator. These are based on
a possible worlds relation which can be reflexive, a pre-ordering, or an equivalence
relation6. These systems are typically called T, S4, and 5 5 respectively.
Consider enriching the syntax of our base language with the standard modalities

L and M , i.e R = { L ) and fl = { M ) . We will then need to add inference figures
to the base collection to account for these operators. Heretofore, nothing was done
with the topology of the possible worlds relation. All generated models contained
a single world and an empty relation. By introducing these modalities, we also
introduce the need to state and use restrictions on the models generated. Hence,
the following inference figures make explicit reference to 3.
'It can also be serial or euclidean, or have other constraints. See [8,4].

Definition 3.2

?These rules contain the proviso that w RLx follows, in the theory of the system s,
from the statements contained in 92, i.e 91 b8w RL x as indicated on the inference
figure. Henceforth we will adopt the convention the bracketed figure represents this
proviso and refrain from noting it explicitly.
*These rules contain the proviso that x does not appear as an ornamentation or
variable in the lower sequent.
Furthermore, we will add the following constraints to the possible worlds relation. The theory of s will contain:
The axiom of reflexivity, Vx .x RLx, if s is T, S4, or S5;
The axiom of transitivity, Vx y z .x RL y A y RL z 3 x RL Z, if s is S4 or S5;
The axiom of symmetry, Vxy .x RL y

> y RL x, if s is S5.

We will refer to these particularizations of LKM as LKMt, LKM84, and LKMss
respectively.
Example 3.1 A proof of Lp 3 LLp in LKMa4or LKMn5would be:

922; Pwz
R2; LPWO

'Pw2
---'

Pw,

N1;Lpwo ---, Lpwl

L-IA
L-IS
L-IS

We could prove soundness of these systems based on the validity preserving
properties of a first order translation of a modal statement7. Instead, we shall offer
the following direct proof based on our interpretation for 8.

Proposition 3.3 (Soundness for LKMT,S4,sS)If kT,S4,SS
a then

~ T , S 4 , S sa

Proof: We merely need to show the additional rules are validity preserving. We will demonstrate the proof for the L rules. The proof for
M is, by symmetry, a trivial modification.
Consider L-IS. Assume the upper sequent of the rule is valid,
but there is a counter model, M, for the lower one. Then there
is a substitution s such that (M,s(w)) &CZ Lp. But, by the proviso
that s does not appear in the lower sequent, and the validity of
the upper sequent we know that (M,s(z)) p for any X-proper
substitution, and hence for all worlds accessible from s(w) in all
models, including s(z) in M . This is a contradiction, so there can
be no such countermodel.
Consider L-IA. Assume the upper sequent is valid, but there is
a countermodel, M, to the lower sequent. Then, there is a substitution s such that (M, s(w)) Lp. But, by validity of the upper
sequent, we know that (M,s(s)) p. By the proviso, it must be
the case that s(w), s(x) E RL.This is a contradiction.

We will show completeness of this system relative to the axiomitisation for the
Hilbert system given in definition C.1, and then appeal to the completeness of that
system. The method of the proof is to show that any formula derived in some
Hilbert system has a corresponding proof in the Gentzen system. In this proof,
we will make essential use of cut; so, the proof demonstrates completeness for the
system with the cut rule. We must then demonstrate that cut-elimination holds for
this system to support a completeness result for the system without cut.
The following lemmas demonstrate that, given an L K M proof for the inputs to
necessitation or modus ponens, we can generate a proof for the output. Formally,
these rules are admissible to the system.
7See the appendix for this alternate soundness proof.
rule is admissible to a system if adding it to the system does not change the theorems of the
system[l3].

8~

Lemma 3.4 The rule of necessitation is admissible to this system.
Proof: If we have a proof for a, we can construct a proof for L a by
the following procedure. Select a new world variable w' not appearing
anywhere in the proof for a. Add the statement w' RL W , where w if the
ornamentation of a, to 8 of the bottom sequent. Apply L-IS to the
bottom sequent, producing a sequent 0; + (La),,. This, then, is a
proof for La.

Lemma 3.5 The rule of modus ponens is admissible to this system.
Proof:
Suppose we have proofs for (a), and ( a > P)k. Then by suitable renaming of ornamentation, we can construct a proof for (P), in the following
fashion. First, note that last step in the proof for a 3 /3 was 3 -IS.
Thus the new proof would join at this last step and become:

0;

--+

(a),

0;(4,

--,

Proposition 3.6 (Relative Completeness of LKM,5) If

(P)w

cut

a then kT,S4,SSa

Proof: The proof is by induction on the length of the Hilbert derivation.
A derivation of length zero consists of some axiom of the system.

It is easy to show that all axioms of the systems under question
are derivable in the appropriate instantiation of L K M

A derivation of length n is some derivation of length n - 1 followed
by the application of one rule of inference to some subset of the
formulas appearing in that derivation. By the induction hypothesis,
there is an LKM proof for those formulas in the system under
question. By the admissibility of the inference rules, we know we
can construct a proof for the the final formula in the sequence based
on the proofs for the basis of the inference rule.

Such a completeness result for Gentzen systems without cut rests fundamentally on cut-elimination for the Gentzen system. We will not prove cut-elimination
directly for of our systems at this point, but postpone the argument to Section 5
where it will be a corollary of a proof transformation.
Systems without cut also exhibit an interesting relationship between ornamentations and members of R in a sequent. If we examine the modality rules, we see
that any world ornament appearing in a sequent must also appear in 82 except for
the initial world. Also, if any relation constraints appear in R, then wO appears
there also. We will formally call this property the containment property

.

Definition 3.3 (The Containment Property) A system exhibits the containment
property if, for any sequent derivable in the system, either R contains no constraints,
I
?
or it is the case that any world ornament of a formula in the sequent appears in !
of that sequent.
All systems in this thesis in fact have the containment property. One immediate
consequence of the containment property is the sharpening of the provisos requiring
arbitrary world variables. Instead of looking at the entire sequent, it now suffices
to consider only the members of R.
Also, notice that it is possible that the model generated by a proof with cut
may not be a generated model. In fact, it may not even be a cohesive model that is, a model where the possible worlds topology is connected. Thus, by showing
cut-elimination for this system, we also have an alternate proof for proposition 2.1.
The exact relationship between cut and the model topology is an issue that
requires further investigation.

3.3

Extensions of LKM to a Logic of Knowledge

The extension of LKM to multiple agents in a system of knowledge is very straightforward. We now assume there are a number of modal operators R = {Kl, Kz, .

..),

and Cl = 8. The rules L-IA and L-IS become a set of rules Ki-IS and Ki-IA for

i = 1,.. ., and the rules M-IA and M-IS are disallowed. The accessibility relation

will be indexed by agent, i.e. there will be n accessibility relations RKi . The possible worlds theory for K will contain the conjunction of the appropriate constrains
on each accessibility relation. The additional rules for LKMK are (schematically):

$This rule contains the proviso that x does not appear as a variable on 8 or an
ornamentation of a formula in the lower sequent.
The theory of K's accessibility relation will contain an axiomitization of the
possible worlds relation for each "knower". Hence we can represent agents which
differing reasoning abilities (e.g. positive introspection, negative introspection) by
varying the restrictions on the different accessibility relations. The proofs of soundness and completeness of these rules is similar to the Propositions 3.3 and 3.6, and
so are omitted.
Modal logics of knowledge are often enhanced by adding modalities indicating
common knowledge (sometimes differentiating between implicit common knowledge, and explicit common knowledge [28,8]). For instance, the following modifications of LKMK extend that system to account for a modal operator 0 representing
common knowledge:

Definition 3.4
1. The addition of a modality, 0 to R.
2. The addition of preorder constraints on Ro to the theory of K.
3. The addition of the axiom Vx y .x RKiy

> x l&

y to the theory of K

4. The addition of the following two rules of inference to LKMK:

$This rule contains the proviso that x does not appear as a variable on X or
an ornamentation of a formula in the lower sequent.

As an example of the flavor of this system, we present the proof of the three
wise men as reported in [28]. The interested reader should refer to that paper and
note the exact correspondence between that (semantic) argument and our proof.

Example 3.2 In the following, interpret pi as the proposition, "wise man i has a
white dot on his head." Ki is, of course, interpreted as, "wise man i knows that",
and 0 is interpreted as, 'it is common knowledge that." The axioms for the wise
man puzzle (adapted from [28]) are:
2. 0(PI v P2

v ps)

We will in general omit inference figures using thinning, since they are easily inserted
from context. The proof is:

-

closes

--

8s;(~s)wa
3 3 ; Kl(p3)Wa

'3;

(ps)Wa

(PI

-

83i3w0
( P S ) W S ( P ~ ) W( ~~~ 1 ) ~ s
Kl-IA, 7-IA
S 3 ; 3 w 0 1 Kl (N ~ 2 ) ~ 2 ( ~ a ) w s( , ~ 1 ) ~ s V-IA

Kl-IA

(ps)wa

- -

a s ; 3 ~ 0( ,K l ( p s ) v Kl(- ps))tua

-

(pn)Wa

8 s ; Ki ( ~ a ) w 2

+

See above

(P~)WZ

-

3 s ;~

~ 0~ , W

3 ~ 0

W O ,

3 2 ;~

O

-

--*

V-IA

( ~ 2 ) t a 2(,~ s ) t u i( ,~

( ~ a ) w a(ps)wa1
,
(~i)ws

Kl-IS

( ~ 2 1 t u 2(ps)Wa,
,
(Ki(~l))wa

- -

3 ~ 0 Ki(p1)

W O ,

3 2 ; 2w0,3w0,4w0

K1-IA, 7 - I A

( ~ 3 ) w 2( ,p i ) W s

Kl -1A

8 s ; 2w0, ( K i ( p a ) V Ki(- h ) ) w a , ( K i ( ~ sV) K i ( - ps))wa
a3;2

+

( ~ 2 ) w s(ps)Wa,
,
(~i)ws

3 3 ; 3w01 ( K l ( p s ) v K l ( - ~ 3 ) ) w 2(,K l ( - ~ a ) ) t u a
923; ( ~ a ) w a

several V-IA

P2 V ~ 3 ) ~ s ( P ~ ) w s ( P ~ )(w~~ 1, ) ~ s
0-IA

+

(pa)Wz, (ps)Wa

~3))wl

8 2 ; 2w013w0,4w01 K 2 ( - ~ 3 ) ) w l

s := 3 2 U { w 2 RK1w 3 )

K2-IA, K3-IA
K2-IA, 7 - I A

( ~ 2 ) ~ 2

K2-IS : 3 2 := !Rl U { w l RK,w2)

(K2~2)wl

'Here we have adopted the convention that [K4]ais shorthand for Kia v Ki
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o-ia, A-IA

--IA

(pa)tua, (ps)toa

8 2 ; ~ W O~, W O , ~ W K
O 2, ( -

:3

i)ws

-

a.

--

R1; ( ~ 3 ) w l

(~3)wl

81;K2(~3)wl

( K 2 ( ~ 3v)K

Ri;2wo,3wo,&o,

8 1 ; 2w0, ~
R1; ~

W O3,

W

--

-

O5 ,w o

( K 2 ~ 2 ) w l( ,P S ) ~ I

-

--*

O P ~ W O

V-IA

( K a ~ ~ ) w( ~
i ,3 ) w i

K3-IA, 1-IA

Ks-IS : 821 := 0 U (wO RKt ~ 1 )

(Ks(p3))Wo
(K3(~3))w0

(1,293,4 , s 3 ( K 3 ( ~ 3 ) ) w 0

o-ia,several A-IA

contraction

( K z P ; ~ ) (wP SI),W I

O

~ 0 ~ 2QWO,
~ 0~ , W

0;

-*

w 0 ~ ~ w 0 ~ ~ w (0~ ,3 )~ w~l 0

0; 2 w 0 , ~ W O~ , W
0; 1

See above

~(-Ps))WI

~ 0 8 4 ~ 0

W O 3,w 0 , ~

0; ~

K2-IA

(PS)W~

thinning
3

-IS, several A-IA

Linear Natural Deduction Proofs1'
In this section we will show how to build natural deduction proofs in modal logic.
These proofs will essentially be an incrementally constructed "linearizationn of the
previously presented Gentzen proofs. The justification of correctness will be based
on sequent systems, and will in fact yield an algorithm for constructing Gentzen
proofs corresponding the natural deduction proofs. As in the preceding section,
we will first present a base collection of outline transforms paralleling the base
collection of inference rules. We will establish correctness of this base set. We
will then demonstrate the procedure for extending the system to the various modal
calculi and demonstrate correctness for those languages. At the end of the section
we present a (slightly edited) proof for the wisemen puzzle (see example 3.2).

4.1

The Base Collection of Proof Outline Transformations

A natural deduction proof will consist of a set of lines and a set of sequents, collectively referred to as a proof outline. The lines in the proof contain a line number, a
set of hypotheses, a formula, and a justification. The line number is merely a label
so that sets of hypotheses can be expressed as sets of numbers rather than lists of
formulae. The combination of hypotheses, formula, and justification correspond to
a sequent and the inference rule applied to derive this sequent from its predecessor. There is one special justification, N J , which marks lines which for which a
justification must be derived.

Definition 4.1 Let L be an ordered set of line labels and J be a set of justifications
containing a special justification N J . A proof line is an ordered tuple (1, U, a,j )
where:
1. 1 E
2. U

L,

L where all members of U

precede I ,

3. a is some formula, and
4. j E J is the justification for this line.
1°This section is primarily based on the notes presented in [20]

The sequents are used to keep track of the "leavesn of the (incomplete) Gentzen
tree. As long as a branch is open, there will be a corresponding sequent in the
proof outline. When a branch closes, the sequent will be deleted. The sequents are
represented as sets of line labels rather than the actual formulae. Lines which appear
on the left side of some sequent are called supporting lines, while lines appearing on
the right side of a sequent are called sponsoring lines.
As long as there are sequents in the outline, there are sponsoring lines yet to
be justified. Later in this section, we present outline transformations which will
permit us to transform outlines into "more completen outlines. This transforming
process will finish when the outline is complete, i.e. when all branches close and
the outline is actually a proof. Note that these proofs, like the Gentzen proofs they
are derived from, will be cut free rather than axiomatic.

Definition 4.2 A proof outline, 0, is a pair, (L, C), where:
1. L is a list of proof lines which is a complete or incomplete ND-proof. A line with

the justification N J represents a piece of a proof which must be completed.
Let Lo be the set of all line labels in L which have this justification. These are
called the sponsoring lines of 0.
2. C = {X; I'l --+ 1 I I E Lo ,rl C L \ Lo) is a set of sequents, where the Iine
labels in rl must precede 1, and 8 encodes the accessibility relation for this
sequent. The lines in r1,called supporting lines, and are said to support I;
while, conversely, 1 sponsors the lines in rr. A line is active if it is either a
supporting line, or a sponsoring line which does not assert I.

It is easy to show that 0 has an active line if and only it C is not empty. We
say that 0 is an outline for A if the last line in 0 (more precisely, in L) has no
hypotheses and asserts (A),O. It is also easy to show that if line a supports line z
then the hypotheses of a are a subset of the hypotheses of z.
A Gentzen proof is begun by writing the formula to be proved on the right side
of the sequent arrow (with Xo on the left side in our case) and applying operational
inference rules until the tree closes or no rules are applicable. In an analogous
fashion, we can define an initial proof outline, called the trivial outline, to which we
apply transformation rules until the outline is complete.

Definition 4.3 Let A be a formula, and let z be the label for the proof line

NJ.
If L is the list containing just z, and C is the set containing just the sequent
80; + z then Oo := (L, C) is clearly an outline. We call this outline the trivial
outline for A.
Example 4.1 A proof outline for the theorem in Example 3.1 is gotten by setting
L = (1,2,3,4,5,6), C = {w1Rw2,wORw1;1,2 + 3) where the lines in L are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

1
1
1
1
1

I-

HYP

(Lp)wo
(P)WZ

L-ded
NJ
1( ~ 1 ~ 2
L-gen
I- ( L P ) ~ I
L-gen
1(LLP)WO
deduct (5)
(6)
1 (LP 3 LLP)WO
It is easy to verify that (L, C) is an outline. Also, by application of Rulep2 to lines
2 and 3, we get a completed outline. l1
Below we list several transformations of outlines. These take an outline, 0 =
(L, C) in which C is not empty, and produce a new structure, 0' = (L', C'), which
(as we shall verify) is also an outline. We shall assume that any sequent of the form

8 ; I' +I is simply another way to write the sequent 8 ; I' --+, i.e the sequent in
which the succedent is empty.

In a Gentzen system, there are antecedent and succedent rules which introduce
connectives into the formulae in the antecedent and succedent of the sequent respectively. Moreover, cut-free Gentzen systems have a subformula property which
states that the formula occurring higher in the tree are simpler (contain fewer connectives) than the formulae lower in the tree. Hence, moving up the tree reduces
the complexity of the formula appearing within sequents until axioms appear and
the branch closes.

In outline transformations, there are D-rules and P-rules which perform a functions analogous to the antecedent and succedent rules of a Gentzen system respectively. The D- rules will be responsible for simplifying the logical complexity of
support lines, while the P- rules simplify the logical complexity of sponsoring lines.
l l A script of the session used to generate this proof appears in the appendix. The text processor
output used to format the above example was also automatically generated.
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A portion of the outline will be closed by the three transformations, RuleP, RuleP1,
and RuleP2. These rules are responsible for giving a justification to a sponsoring
line without creating a new sponsoring line. In this case, C' results from removing
a sequent from C and justifying a sponsoring line.
The transformations below explicitly describe how to compute new members of
C' from members of C. If a sequent, a, in 0 is unaffected by the transformation,
then we assume that a E C'. A similar description for computing L' from L is given
by showing two boxes of proof lines separated by an arrow. The box on the left
contains lines present in L, while the box on the right contains lines present in L'.

If a line appears in the box on the right but not in the box on the left, we add
this new line to L' in the position indicated by the alphabetical ordering of the line
labels. If a line appears in both boxes, then its justification has been changed from

N J in L to a new justification in L'. It is always the case that all the lines in L are
contained in L'.
If C' is not empty, then each sequent a' E C' is of two kinds. If no line in a' was
altered or inserted by the transformation, then o' E C. Otherwise, a' is constructed
from a unique a E C. Some transformations, like D-Disj and P-Conj, will construct
two sequents in C' from a sequent in C. Most of the D- and P- transformations will
construct one sequent in C' from one in C.

Definition 4.4 (The Base Collection of Outlines)
D-Coqj
Here a is a supporting line in 0. C' is the result of replacing a with the lines b,c
everywhere in C, i.e. line o is no longer active.

I(a) )I

k

( A 1 A A 2 ) . ~ u l e ~=>l

(b) X
(c) X

(AI)w
(A2)w

RuleP: a
RuleP: a

D-Disj
Let a be a disjunctive support line and let line z be a sponsor for line a. Build
C' by replacing the sequent X;r, + z with the two sequents R;I', b ---+ m and
R;I', n +y, where I' := I', \ { a ) .

(a) 1'
(2)

II-

(AlVA2)w
(C)W#

RU1eXl
=>

NJ

(b) b I- ( A l ) ,
HYP
( m ) X , b I(C)W~
NJ
( n ) 7% i- (A2)w
HYP
( Y ) U,n I- (qW#
NJ
( z ) U I- (C),(
Cases: a, m , y

D-BackChaini
Let i = 1,2 and set j := 3 - i. Let a be a disjunctive support line which is sponsored
z. I f we let Co := C \ (8; I', + z )
by z, and let a be the sequent 8 ; I?, a
t h e n C t : = C o u { 8 ; I ' -+ m,%;I',n ---, 2).
-+

(m) XI
(a) U
(2)

Ul

tI-

=>

(+)w

NJ

I-

(Ail,
HYP
( x ) U l , n 1(C)w
NJ
( y ) Ul I- ( A j > C ) , deduct:^
( 2 ) U1
I(C),
RuleP: a, m , y
(n)

( A 1 V A 2 ) , RuleX
(C)w
NJ

I-

D-ModusPonens
Let a be an implicational support line, which is sponsored by line z and let a be
I', a --+ z, Add the lines below to the outline. If we set Co :=
the sequent 8;
C \ (8;I', -+ z ) then C' := C o u {%;I'+ m , R;I',n + 2).

(a) U
(2)

Ul

iI-

(A1 > A2),
(C)w

RuleX
NJ

/

=>

( m ) U1 I(&)w
NJ
( n ) n I- (A2)w
HYP
( 2 ) Ul,n
I- (C)w
NJ
(y) U1 I( A 23 C ) , Deduct: x
( z ) U1 I- ( C ) ,
RuleP: a, m, y

D-ModusTollens
The qualifications for this transformation are the same as those for D-ModusPonens.

(a) U

t-

XI

I-

(2)

(Al 3 A2),
(C)W

RuleX
NJ

( m ) X I I( 4 2 ) ~
NJ
( n ) n I- (1Al)W
HYP
( 2 ) H I , 12
I(c)w
NJ
( y ) Ul I( l A l > C ) , Deduct: x
( z ) U1 I- ( C ) , RuleP: a, m, y

D-Imp
This rule treats implication as if it were an abbreviation of a disjunction. C' is the
result of replacing a with b in each sequent of C. Line a is no longer active.
I(a) U

I-

(Al 3 A,),

~ u l e ~
=>]

I(b) U

I-

(-.Al V A2),

RuleP

1

D-Neg
Apply one of the following four sub-transformations to line a, depending on which
one matches the structure of a. C' is the result of replacing a with b in each sequent
of C.

1 (a)

#

I-

=>
=>
=>
2 ~ u) l e
~ ~
=>l

(-.A1 3 ~

kb)

#

I-

(A),

I(b)

#

I-

(Al A 7A2)w RuleP: a1

RuleP: a1

D-Thinning
If line a supports line z, then we can drop line a as a support of line z.

Each of the P-rules listed below will "process" a sponsoring line z. Let
x0 := c \ {R; rz + 2).
P-Coqj
Set C' := Co u {R; I?,

+

rn,8 ; I',

--+

y).

(x) 1 , a I- (A2)w
(y) # I- ( l A l 3 A2), Deduct: x
(z) # I(A1 V A2)w RuleP: y

P-Disj2
Set C' := Co u (8;
I'z, a

+

XI(x) 1 , a I- (A1)w
(y) # I- (-A2 2 A1), Deduct: x
(2) #
I- (Al V A2),
RuleP: y

P-Imp
Set C' := C U ( 8 ; I?,, a

---+

Y).
(Y) 1 , a I- (A2)w
(z) # I- (Al 2 A2)w Deduct: y

P-Contrapositive
Set C' := C U {R;I',,a

---, x).

t-

(5)

(y) X
(z) X

k

I-

( 4 ,
(1A2 > lAl)Jleduct: x
(A1 > A2),
RuleP: y

P-Neg
Apply one of the following four sub-transformations. Set C' := Co U (8;
I?,

I>

Set C' := C u {R;I',,a +y).

(Y)

X,a

(2)

X

+ y).

I- 1

t-

(4,

IP: y

P-Thinning
We may replace line z with line y as a sponsoring line, provided that what we
get is still an outline. In this case, set C' := Co U (R;I', -4 y), where Co :=
C\{R;I', + z).
NJ
1
(A),
RuleP: y
(4
IThe following three versions of the RuleP transformation are used to complete a
subproof, i.e. they remove a sequent from the list of the outline's sequents. RulePl
and RuleP2 are included here for technical reasons to be made clear later. They
are obviously subsumed by RuleP.

I(%)

I-

(4,

NJI

=>

(Y)

I-

RuleP

Let lines al, . .. ,an be some of the supports of z, such that [R,A (A1)wlA . . . A
(A,),,] 3 (A), is tautologous. Then we can change the justification of line z from
N J to RuleP: al,
,an. C' is Co.

...

(al)

XI

t-

(Al)w1

RuleX

(an)

Xn

I-

(An),=

RuleX

=>
(A),

(2)

I (z)

X

t-

I

(A), RuleP: al, . . . ,a,

NJ

RuleP1
If Al and A2 are complementary, signed atoms, then we have proved line z indirectly.
Set C' := Co.
RuleX
X2

(A2)w

RuleY

=>

I(%)

X

t-

(A),

RuleP : a1,a2

/

RuleP 2
If Al and A2 are signed atoms which are equal to each other, then we have proved
line z directly. Set C' := Co.
(a) XI

(&)w

(4

(A2)w

N2

RuleYI

=>

(4

F

(A2).

RuleP: a1

NJ

Notice that after a D- transformation is applied, the line a may or may not still be
active, while after a P- transformation is applied, the line z is no longer active.

4.2

Correctness of the Base Collection

In order to show that natural deduction proofs built using the above defined outline
transformations are correct, we will show that:
1. The rules 1-EA and 1-ES which eliminate negation for the antecedent and

succedent are admissible to LKM, and in fact give a procedure for removing
those rules from a completed proof.
2. For each application of an outline transformation, there is a corresponding
piece of an LKM proof which is a derivation of the new sequent in the outline
from the old sequent.
3. Each use of the various forms of rulep remove a sequent only if there is an

LKM proof for that branch.

There is a slight technical problem in that the correspondence between outline
transformations and Gentzen proofs is not complete. In particular, the D-Neg rules
manipulate formulae in a way which is not directly justifiable in terms of LKM
inferences. To remedy this, we introduce the following three outline transformation
rules. These are essentially composite transformations based on those given in
Section 4.

Definition 4.5 Let D-Imp* be the transformation which results from combining
D-Imp and D-Disj, i.e. apply D-Disj to the disjunctive line produced by D-Imp.
Let D-Neg* be the transformation which does the following: applies D-Neg, and if
that instance of the transformation was not used to remove double negation, then
applies either D-Conj, D-Disj, or D-Imp, depending on the structure of the proof
line resulting from the D-Neg application. Let P-Neg* be the transformation which
does the following: applies P-Neg, and if that instance of the transformation was
not used to remove double negation, then applies either P-Conj, P-Disj, or P-Imp
depending on the structure of the proof line resulting from the P-Neg application.
Definition 4.6 Consider the following class of outline transformations: D-Conj,
D-Disj, D-Imp*, D-Neg*, P-Conj, P-Disj 1, P-Imp, P-Neg*, RulePl, RuleP2, and
P-Indirect. We shall call this collection the minimal collection of transformations.
Notice that C' contains fewer sequents than C if and only if the transformation
rule applied was RulePl or RuleP2, and therefore, C' c C. This is simple to verify
by checking that all the D- and P- transformations in the minimal collection never
decrease the number of elements in the sequent set. RulePl and RuleP2, however,
do decrease this number by one, by removing a sequent (i.e. supplying a justification
to an N J line).

In the following, let LKM* denote the base collection plus the rules 1-EA and
1-ES.
Proposition 4.1 If some sequent has a proof in LKM*, it has a proof in LKM.
Proof: The proof is a simple induction-like procedure showing the elimination rules can be moved up the tree and finally eliminated.
For the ground case, consider a tree of height one, where the elimination rules lead to an axiom. Then we have:

converts to

-P

P
'PIP

1-IA

and similarly for 1-EA.
Note the elimination rules can be "slid" past all introduction rules,
other than 1-IA in the case of 1-ES and 1-1s in the case of
1-EA, by virtue of the fact that those rules cannot interfere with
the applicability of the elimination rules. We will demonstrate this
for A-IA.

converts to

A-IA

For the negation introduction rules, we have the following cases:

....
LP

r

+

RuleX
A

+ l p , ~

LP

+

1-IA
1-ES

A

converts to

....
F,P
and similarly for -EA.
1

+

RuleX

A

Proposition 4.2 Assume that 0' = (L', C') is the result of applying some transformation from the minimal collection of transformations to the outline 0 = (L, C) .
If C' is properly contained in C and a ; I', ---, z is a member of C and not of C',
then R; I?, + z has a cut-free, LKM*-proof.
Proof: Assume the hypotheses of this theorem. Clearly the transformation applied to 0 was either RulePl or RuleP2.
Assume that it was RulePl. Then ,'I must have contained two lines,
say a and b which asserted (A), and (-A),, respectively, where (A),
is an atomic formuIa. Let (C),, be the assertion in line z , and let
I' := ,'I \ {a,b). Then a cut-free, LKM*-proof of 8 ;,'I -+ z is the
following.

a ; (A),, (1A)W

+

several Thinning

Assume that it was RuleP2. Then I?, must have contained a line say
a which asserts (A),, where (A), is an atomic formula and such that
z asserts (A),. Then a cut-free, LKM*-proof of 8 ; I?, + z is simply
the following. Here, I? := I?, \ ( a ) .
~;(A)W
+ (A),

several Thinning

Proposition 4.3 Let 0' be the result of applying one of the transformations in the
minimal collection to the outline 0. Let C and C' be the sequent sets associated
with 0 and 0'. If each sequent in C' has a cut-free, LKM*-proof then each sequent
in C has a cut-free, LKM*-proof. We will refer to an outline transformation having
this property as correct.
Proof: If the transformation which was applied was either RulePl or
RuleP2, then the preceding Proposition says that the sequent removed
from C has an cut-free, LKM*-proof. In the cases where a D- or Ptransformation was applied, either one or two sequents in C' are constructed from a sequent in C . (More than one or two sequents in C' may
have been constructed, however, from the application of some transformations.) Below we show how to combine cut-free, LKM*-proofs for
those one or two sequents to give a cut-free, LKM*-proof of the original
sequent in C. Let (C),, denote the formula asserted by a line supported

by (A),. We shall not specify when the inference rule of interchange is
used, since it will be easy for the reader to insert them in the inference
figure where they are required.
Case D-Conj:

8 ; r, (Al)w, (A2)w

a ; r , ( A l A A2)w,(A2)w
8 ; r, (A1 A A,),,

+

8;r

+

+

(C)Wt

Case D-Neg: If a asserts

(
1
1

If a asserts (l.Al V

then

Contraction

(C)ov'

+

V-IA

(C)w'

1-EA
8 ; r, (
+

(C)W'

+

(C)Wt

~

~ (cIwt
1
~

+

3 -1A

A), then

92; r, (lAl)w, (7A2)w
8 ; r, ( 4 2 ) w

8;r

(C)wt

+

92; (A1 2 A2)w,

8;r

A-IA

B ; ~ , ( A ~ ) ~ (cIWl

(c)~~
( A, I ) ~

a ;r

A-IA

(C)w'

---+

-+

(C)wt

92; r, (A1 v A2)w
Case D-Imp*:
8;r, ( 4 ) w

--'

(A1 A A2)w

92; r, (A1 A A2)w
Case D-Disj:
R;r, (4)w

(CIw'

+

-4

+

(c),~, (AI),,

---, (c),I,

+

8 ; I?

(c)wl,

1-EA
1-EA

p2lW

v-IS

(AI v A ~ )( ~~ ,~ 1 ,

(C)Wt, (A1 v Aa)w, (A1 V Az)uI
+

(C)Wt, (A1 v A2)w

8 ; I', (1.Al v A2)w
Tf a asserts (-.Al A A2)wthen

+

(~WI

v-IS
Contraction

1-IA

If a asserts ( l . A 1 > At)w then

Case P-Conj:

%;r

+

xir

(&lW

8;r

+

+

( A ~ ) ~
A-IA

(A1 A A2)w

Case P-Disjl:

8;r

R;r

+

+

(A1 v A2)w, (A1 V A2)w

3;r
Case P-Imp:

Case P-Neg:

If z asserts ( l l A ) w , then

If z asserts (-.A1

V

(Al)w, (A2)w

Az), then

(AI v

-+

V-IS, twice
Contraction

%;I'

+

(1Al)W

%I',(A1)W

R; I'

1-ES

%; r, (A2)w --,

+

%I',(Al v A2)w
R; I'
If z asserts (-.Al

A

(42)w

+

+

--+

1-ES
V-IA

1-1s

(i.Al V A2lw

A2), then
8;

,(11Al)w

B; I'

+

+

( 4 2 )w

( 4 2 ) w , (1Al)W

x;r,(Al)w

+

R;I'

A

+

A2)w

1-ES

+

RI', (A1 A A2)w,(A1 A A2)w
%;I',(A1

7-ES

(lA2)w

B;L(A1)w,(A2)w

1-EA

A-IA twice
+

+

Contraction

1-1s

(i.Al A A2lw

If z asserts (l.Al > A2)wthen

R;r, r, (A1 3 A2)w
%;I',(A1 2 A2)w

+

+

several Contractions

1-IA

R;l? + (-.Al 2 A2lw
Case P-Indirect :

Proposition 4.4 Let A be a formula, and let Oo be the trivial outline for A. If
there is some list (TI,. .. ,T,) of transformations from the minimal collection of
transformation such that 0 := Tn(. .. (TI(Oo) ...) contains an empty sequent set,
then the lines in 0 form a completed ND-proof of A and A has an LKM-proof.
Furthermore, this LKM-proof can easily be constructed by using the constructions
given in the proofs of Propositions 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3.

Proof: Is an immediate consequence of the preceding propositions. 1
Extensions to this basic system will involve adding more outline transforms
to the base collection. Soundness of these systems will be based solely on the
correctness of the new outline transforms with implicit reference to the preceding
proposition.

Outline Transformations for Logics of Knowledge

4.3

We will now extend the base set of transformations to encompass modal operators.
Since the classical systems are contained in the knowledge systems, we will give
rules for the knowledge systems and establish correctness for those rules.
As it turns out, there are two different sets of outline transformations possible
for modal operators in R depending on whether the dual modality is present in

n. We will consider both those cases below.

The justification for the modalities is

based on whether the introduction of the modal operator forces the generation of a
new related world, or uses the structure contained on 3? to deduce a relationship.

Definition 4.7 Let the set of outline transformation rules for the modal operators
with dual modalities be comprised of the base collection plus the following rules
for each p E R and w E fl.

D-P
Let a be a modal support line, and suppose that w Rpw' follows from
with a replaced by a, b, i.e line a stays active.

(I).

x

t-

(P(P))w

~ u l e x l =>

( (b)

X

I-

(P)~I

X. C' is C
pded: a]

D-w
Let a be a modal support line, and w' is a new world not appearing in X. C' is the
result of replacing a by b, and adding w R, w' to 3? in C.

(4 M
( 4

u

(w(P))w
(c)w

RuleX
NJ

(Y)
( 4

I-

M,b

I-

(C)w
(C)w

w-gen: a, y

D-Neg
We also need the following two transforms which are cases of D-Neg in the base
collection:

=>
=>

(b) U

b

(wlp),

RuleQ: a

U

I-

(pip),

RuleQ: a

(b)

p-P
Let z be a modal sponsoring line and let w' be some world which is not free in 8.
Set C' := Co U (8,
w Rpw'; I?, --,y ) .

P-wl
In this case, z is a modal sponsoring line and w R, w' follows from 8.
Let C' := C o u ( 8;r, --, y ) .

1 )

x

t

(w(p))w

NJI

=>

(Y)

(4

l/
U

I-

(P)~I
(w(P))w

NJ
w-ded: y

P-w2
In this case, z is a modal sponsoring line and w R, w' follows from X . Here, we
allow the formula of the sponsoring line to be used again by inserting it the outline as a hypothesis and processing the new sponsoring line by contradiction. Let
C' := Co U ( 8 ;I?,, a, b -+ y ) .

P-Neg
We also need the following two transforms under the same conditions as P-Neg of
the base collection:

If there are modal operators for which the dual does not exist in the language,
then we have to treat negative modalities containing that modal operator in a
fashion similar to that found in the D-Neg* rules of the correctness proof. In

other words, instead of using a negation rule to move the negation inward and then
applying the appropriate rule for the modality, we will do both at once.
Definition 4.8 Let the set of outline transformation rules for the modal operators
without dual modalities be comprised of the base collection plus the following rules
for each p E R12
D-P
Let a be a modal support line, and suppose that w Rp w' follows from 8. C' is C
with a replaced by a, b wherever it occurs, i.e. line a stays active.

).(I

w

I-

(P(P))W

~ u l e x l =>

I (b)

X

I-

(P),I

pded: a ]

D-Neg
We need the following case of the D-Neg rules given in the base collection. Here w'
is some new world. Replace a by b wherever it occurs in C to get C'.
(a)

x

I-

( ~ ( p ) ) ~~ u l e ~
=>l

I(b)

X

I-

(1p)L

p-gen: a

p-P
Let z be a modal sponsoring line and let w' be some world which is not free in 8.
Set C' := Co U (8,w Rp w'; I?, -+ y).

P-Negl
We also need following case of P-Neg where 8 l- wRw', and C' := Co U { 8 ; I?,

-+

y)

P-Neg2
Finally, we need following case of P-Neg where 8 I- wRwl: In this case C' :=
Co u {8;F,,a,b
y)

-

pded: a
NJ

Proposition 4.5 The rules given in definitions 4.7 and 4.8 are correct.
nI''

order not to belabor the presentation, we consider only universal modalities. We leave it to
the reader to supply the outline transformations for existential modalities having no dual in the
language.

Proof:
Since the rules of definition 4.8 are the D-Neg* rules for definition 4.7,
the following proof establishes the claim.
Case D-p:
~;r,(pP)w,(P)w~

(C)w1

x ; r, ( P P ) ~( ,P P ) ~

(C)Wl

+

+

x;r,(PP)~

p-IA
Contraction

(C)Wl

+

Case D-w:

The proviso on w' set by w-IA is satisfied by the condition of D-w, and
the proviso on w Rp w' set by p-IA is satisfied by the condition on D-p.
Case D-Neg of definition 4.8 and D-Neg* for definition 4.7:
If a asserts (lpp), then

If a asserts (lwp), then

x ; r, (1wp)w

+

(C)Wl,MP

x ; I-, ( T W P ) ~
(1wp)w
,
B;r,(-JP)w

+

+

1-IA

(C)Wl

Contraction

(C)Wl

As in the D-w and D-p cases, the provisos on p-IS and w-IS are met
by the conditions on D-p and D-w.
Case P-p:
8 , w Rpw1;r + (P)wl

8;r

-+

(PP)~

p-IS

Case P-w:

fR;r

-+

a;r

(wP)~,(wP)w contraction

+

(wp)w

As in the D-w and D-p cases, the provisos on the rules are satisfied by
the restrict ions on the outline transformation.
Case P-Neg of definition 4.8 and P-Neg* of definition 4.7:

If z asserts (iwp), then

If z asserts (lpp),, then (for the general case)
~,WRpw1;r,(P~)w,(~)w~
z ; r, ( P P ) ~(PP)~"
,

+

P-IA
contraction

The provisos on p-IA and w-IA are (again) satisfied by the conditions
on the corresponding outline transformations.

Example 4.2 The following is a partially completed (and somewhat edited) version
of the wise man problem presented in example 3.213. The reader should refer to
that example for the interpretation of the propositions and modal operators, and
the axiomitization of the puzzle. Also, note that a set of outline transformations
for the 0 modality were included with provisos corresponding to those stated in
Definition 3.4.
First we have broken down all of the initial information by applications of propositional rules, and employed the common knowledge transformations to deduce lines
7 and 8.
lSThe initial version of this proof was automatically generated, and that version edited for
readability.

( 1 ~ 2 ~ 3 ~ 4 ~ 5 ) ~ ~
(2 3 r\ 4 A 5),0
(O(P~v P2 A PS))WO
(O([Kl]Ps) A [Ks]plA ([Kl]p2)A [K2IPlA [K2IPsA [&IP2) wo
([KlIPs) A [&]PI A ([K1]p2)A [K2]p1A [K2IPSA [Ks]P2)wl
([KlIPS) A [KS]PIA ([Kilpz) A [K2]p1A [K2IPsr\ [Ks]P2)w2
(K~Psv KlTs)w2
(KlP2 v K 1 7 ~ 2 ) ~ 2
(K2Ps K21~s)wl
(KsK27K1~1
AKslK2~2)~~

HYP
Rulep(1)
Rulep (3)
Rulep(5)
0-ia(6)
0-ia(6)
Rulep (8)
Rulep(8)
Rulep (15)
Rulep(1)

The lines below are using modality rules to infer new information about what propositions are known by whom.
Rulep (18)
Ks-ded(l9)
K2-ded(20)
Rulep (18)
Ks-ded(22)
K2-gen(23)

These lines represent a stage of the proof about half way through. It remains to
justify the right branch of the argument by cases (line 30).

The lines below represent the lowest closed branch of the cases argument.

BYP
K1-ded
Rulep (26)
cases: 16,28,25
Ks-gen
deduct(32)
4.4

Two More Types of Outline Transformations

Thus far, all the material presented in this section has been directly justifiable in
terms of a cut-free LKM proof. A "real" mathematician, however, would seldom

produce a proof which is, in a sense, cut-free. Instead he makes suitable definitions
and states and proves lemmata which build to the ultimate conclusion he seeks.
Proofs stated in this form are naturally clearer and easier to read as they are
shorter and more compact.
The method of outline transformations is a computat ional method of incrementally constructing a proof under partial or total guidance by a human. In order
to make this method more palatable, we should allow the use of definitions and
lemmata in this system.
The following outline transformations are one possible approach to the use of
these tools. The introduction of lemmata and axioms leads to the need to use
the cut rule. The use of definitions requires the modification of L K M to support
definition inferences. Here, we must also assume some database axioms, definitions,
and previously proved theorems of the system. In the sequel a and $ are arbitrary
ornamented formulas.

P-Ax
This transform allows the introduction of external information from some external
database. It is assumed that a is a member of that database. The justification MP
stands for modus ponens. In this case, C' := Co U { 8;a, r,

-+

y)
Given

D-Def
This introduces definitions in supporting lines.
is an instance of a where some
subformula has been replaced by its definition. Replace a by b wherever it occurs
in C to get C'.

+

I(a) X

I-

o

~ u l e ~=>l

I (b)

X

I-

+

Def: a1

P-Def
This transform allows the introduction of definitions in sponsoring lines. In the
following, is an instance of a where some subformula of a has been replaced by
its definition. In this case, C' := Co U ( 92;I?, + y)
NJ
(Y) )(,a -I

+

+

(z) N

I-

u

DeEy

The justification for P-Ax is:

~ ; r

+

u

R ; ~ , u-+
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cut

For definitions, we assume that the system LKM has been augmented with

definition inference rules. B y this, we mean the upper sequent of the rule differs
from the lower by replacement of a subformula of a member of the lower sequent
by its definition. The justifications are then:

The example sessions shown in the appendix demonstrate the use of definitions.

5

Towards a Unification of Proof Representations

Thus far we have presented two proof systems. First, we introduced the L K M
family. This system had the character of standard logical systems. This made it
easy to discuss in a formal manner and demonstrate its properties. At the other
end of the spectrum, the outline technique is clearly oriented toward computational
editting of proofs. This makes the formalization straightforward to implement, but
difficult to analyze.
Ideally, what we would like is some structure which is theoretically "cleann, yet
is also computationally oriented. If done correctly, it should be straightforward to
translate this structure into LKM, outline transformations, or any other style of
modal proof we might develop. The purpose of this section is to develop such a proof
representation. This representation will be based on expansion trees as developed
by Miller [18,19,21].
Expansion trees (ET's) were originally developed as a proof representation for
higher order logic. As such, they provide a Herbrand type of result for that class of
languages. ET-proofs are structured to be are a compact representation of a proof,
yet contain all the essential information to generate Gentzen proofs, linear natural
deduction proofs, Hilbert style proofs, and linear reasoning proofs [21].
As mentioned above, modal logics and higher order logics can be viewed as somewhat orthogonal extensions to classical first order logic. Since ET's are sufficient
for higher order logic, the question naturally arises as to whether this structure
is adaptible to modal logics. This section addresses this question by developing a
modal analog of ET proofs, called modal ezpcrnsion tree proofs (MET-proofs), which
will encode a (propositional) modal proof.
We wiIl motivate the discussion by examining the ET proof for the first order
translation14 of a formula in the system S4. This examination of ET's for modal
translations will serve the dual purpose of providing an introduction to ET's for
those unfamiliar with the formalism, and revealing certain structural regularities
which will motivate the definition of MET'S. The result will be a structure resem14See appendix section B for an explanation of the translation of modal statements to first order
equivalent statements

bling ET's and the criteria for that structure which deliniate proofs from non-proofs
of modal statements.

5.1

MET Proofs

An expansion tree represents both the logical structure of a formula, and the substitutions required to generate a tautologous instance of it. Two functions, S h and
Dp, map expansion trees to a quantified formula and to the instantiated form of
the formula respectively. Rather than use Skolemization to ensure proper use of
substitution, expansion trees have two order relations defined on the substitution
terms which serve the same purpose.
The following definition is a slightly modified version of that found in [21]. In
the sequel, let SYA denote A with the substitution of t for all free occurrences of
the variable x in A.

Definition 6.1 We now define expansion trees, dud ezpansion trees, selected variables, expunsion terms, and two functions S h and Dp which map expansion trees
and dual expansion trees to formulas.
1. If A is an atom, p, then A is both an expansion tree and a dual expansion tree.
Dp(A) := Sh(A) := p.
2. If Q is an expansion tree (dual expansion tree), then

-

Q is a dual expansion
tree (expansion tree). Sh(- Q) :=- Sh(Q) and Dp(- Q) :=- Dp(Q).
3. If Q1 and Q2 are expansion trees or dual expansion trees, then so are Q1x(Q2.
s h ( Q 1 ~ ~ Q:=
2 ) Sh(Q1)NSh(Q2) and Dp(QlNQ2) := D P ( Q ~ ) N D P ( Q ~ ) .
4. If Q2A is universal and occurs positively (existential and occurs negatively),
and Q is an expansion tree (dual expansion tree) for SzA, y not selected in Q,
'Y
then Q' := A +Y Q is an expansion tree (dual expansion tree). Sh(Q1) := A
and Dp(Q1) := Dp(Q). We say y is selected in Q'.
5. If QxA is existential and occurs positively (universal and occurs negatively),
and Q1,. ..Q, is a list of expansion trees (dual expansion trees) for
S::A,. ..,S P A then Q' := A + t l Q1 + t ~. +tn
. Qn is an expansion tree (dual
expansion tree) with expansion terms tl, ...t,. Sh(Qt) := A and Dp(Q1) :=
Dp(Q1) V . V Dp(Qn) (Dp(Qf):= Dp(Q1) A -.A Dp(Qn))-

-

We will say an arc or node dominates another arc or node in and MET if the
former occurs above the latter in that tree. We will also use the symbol 3 as an
abbreviation for

- ...v ....

Let SQand 0Qbe the set of selection and expansion terms respectively for an
ET,

Q-

Definition 5.2 Let <$ be a binary relation on Sq such that z <$ y if there is a
t E e9 such that z is free in t and a node dominated by (the arc labelled with)
t is selected by y. Let <Q denote the transitive closure of <.: This is called the
imbedding relation for Q .
Definition 5.3 An expansion tree, Q is sound if none of the free variables in Sh(Q)
are selected in Q. An expansion tree is an expansion tree for A if Sh(Q) = A and
Q sound. An ET-proof for A is an expansion tree, Q, for A such that:
1. Dp(Q) is tautologous, and
2. <Q is acyclic.

Figure 1 is an ET for the translation of Lp

> LLp.

This ET can be turned into

an ET-proof by attaching, by an implication operator, another ET representing the
possible worlds relation constraints such that the deep form of the entire structure
is tautologous.
Expansion trees for the translations of modal formula would be a sound and
complete proof representation for modal systems of logic. However, we can make
the following observations. Note that each occurrence of a modality appears in the
tree as a selection or expansion followed by an implication operator. This makes
the ETs very "bushy" compared to the information they hold. Moreover, in the
first-order case, these selections and expansions treat quantification over worlds the
same a s quantification over individuals. We generally would like to differentiate
between worlds and individuals. Lastly, every expansion tree will be prefaced by
the restrictions on the possible worlds relation which are all of essentially the same
form.
These observations lead us to define a new structure, modal expansion trees,
which are a specialization of expansion trees to modal logic. METs will resemble
ETs, but are made more compact by distinguishing between relational information
and propositional information. In particular, we will add generation and deduction
nodes which mirror selection and expansion nodes, respectively, but are only used
for the possible worlds relation.

Sh(M) = [ V w l .wO RL~
D p ( M ) = [wO

1

F >( w ~ ) >] V

RLW I D V W . ~ ~ RL
1 ~2
r). ~ RL
1 ~2 D F ( w ~ ) ]

W .wO
~

RL~ 2 > 5 ( ~ 2 )3] [wO RL~ 1

S = { w l , w2)

0 = {w2)
<At=

{)
Figure 1: An ET for the translation of L p > L L p
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Definition 5.4 Here we define the modal expansion tree (MET) of a formula A,
denoted M, the functions Dp and Sh, generation and deduction variables, associated
literals, and free world variable.
1. If A is an atom, p, then Q := (p), is both an expansion tree and a dual
expansion tree. Dp(Q) := F(w) and Sh(Q) := (p),. We will refer to w as the
free world variable in Q and denote this by Q[w] We will often refer to a tree of

this form as the trivial tree, and F(w) as the literal associated with this node.
2. If Q[w] is an expansion tree (dual expansion tree), then (- Q) [w] is a dual expansion tree (expansion tree). Sh(- (Q),) := (- Sh(Q)), and Dp(- Q) :=DP(Q).
3. If Ql[w] and Qz[w] are expansion trees or dual expansion trees, then so is
( Q I ) ~ ( Q ~ ) [Ifw ]Sh(Q1)
.
= a, and Sh(Q2) = P,, then S ~ ( Q ~ X Y
:=Q((YMP),,
~)
and D P ( Q ~ M Q:=
~ )Dp(Ql)#Dp(Qz).
4. If A is universal and occurs positively (existential and occurs negatively), the
matrix of A is A', the operator of A is p and Q[w] is an expansion tree
(dual expansion tree) for A', then Q' := (A
Q) [XI is an expansion tree
(dual expansion tree) provided x is not generated in Q. Sh(Q1) := (A), and
Dp(Q1) := x R, w 3 Dp(Q) (Dp(Q1) := x R, w A Dp(Q)). w is the generation
variable for Q', and x Rpw is the literal associated with this generation arc.

+,

5. If A is existential and occurs positively (universal and occurs negatively), the

matrix of A is A', the operator of A is p and Ql[wl], .. .Q,[w,] is a list of expansion trees (dual expansion trees) for A' then Q' := (A +"I Q1 +"? ..
Q,) [XI
is an expansion tree (dual expansion tree) with deduction terms wl, . ..w,.
Sh(Q') := (A), and Dp(Q1) := (x Rpwl) A Dp(Q1)) V . ..V (x Rpw, A Dp(Q,))
(Dp(Q') := (X Rp wl 3 Dp(Q1)) A ... A (X RpW, 2 Dp(Q,))) . x Rp wi is the
literal associated with the deduction arc labelled with wi.

+""

Generation and deduction terms are a restricted case of selection variables and
expansion terms, and

SO

must satisfy many of the same properties. In particular,

they have a similar order relation.

Definition 5.5 Given an MET, M, let

EM

= {W

IW

is a deduction variable in M)

T M = {w 1w is an generation variable in M)
Definition 5.6 Let M be an MET. Define a relation <& on T by wi <& wj if
wi E C, and the arc labelled with wi dominates the arc labelled with wj. Let < M
denote the transitive closure of <
: .

S h ( M ) = L p > LLp

Dp(M) = [wORLw2 > fi(w2)I 3
[wO

(LP)wo (LLP)wo
w2

1

RL~1

3 . ~ RL
1 w2

> fi(w2)]

c = (w2)
T = { w l , w2)

Figure 2: The MET proof for Lp

> LLp

The MET, as defined, represents the structure of the modal formula and some
of the possible worlds structure. We must somehow represent the theory of the
possible worlds relation. In the most general case, we will do this by associating
and expansion tree for the possible worlds theory with certain conditions attached.
For theories such as T or S4, we can in fact collapse the structure of MET's to be
much more concise.

Definition 5.7 An MET M of A is an MET proof for A if
1. There is a sound expansion tree, Q, such that Dp(Q) > D p ( M ) is tautologous,
2. The free variable of M does not appear generated in M,
3. No generated world variable of

M appears selected in Q, and

4. <M U <Q is acyclic15.

We can derive different classes of MET's by restricting Q to be an expansion tree
for some set of axioms specifying the restrictions on the possible worlds relation.
For example, figure 5.1 is the MET-proof for Lp

>

LLp in S4. Notice how this

representation compares with that of figure 1.
We will show METs are sound and complete by demonstrating equivalence of
the MET for a formula to the ET of the first order translation of a formula.

Proposition 5.1 A modal formula M has an MET proof, M , iff it's translation,
A, has an ET proof.
lSWe will abuse notation and henceforth denote this as < ~ , g .
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Proof: (sketch)
Proof of this proposition involves showing that we can convert one proof
representation to the other and still yield a proof.
1. Assume we have an MET proof. By the previous discussion, there
is a simple recursive translation from an MET proof to a sound ET,
Q2, of s ~ ( M ) . Thus, the deep formulas are logically equivalent. By
definition, there is some ET Q1 such that Q1 3 Q2has a tautologous deep formula. Imbedding relation of this ET is identical to
that of the MET, and so is acyclic. Hence, this is an ET-proof.
2. The proof in the other direction is similar, and so is omitted.

Corollary 5.2 MET's are a sound and complete proof representation for modal
logic.
Proof: By virtue of the preceding proposition, the correctness of translation to first-order equivalent statements, and the soundness and completeness of ET's as a proof representation.
4

5.2

Automatic Generation of LKM proofs

There is a striking similarity between MET-proofs and sequential proofs as presented in section 3. We can, in fact, show an explicit connection between METproofs and sequential proofs by demonstrating a procedure for translating METproofs to sequential proofs. This procedure will also provide an example of the use
of the various properties of MET's, and provides, as a corollary, a completeness
result for L K M without the cut rule.
The approach will be to define an analog sequent system which operates on
MET-proofs. This system will be in exact correspondance with the L K M system,
and proofs in the analog system will be directly translatable in to L K M proofs via
use of Sh as defined over MET's. Following the terminology of Miller [20],we shall
call this the Q-system of inference; and, it shall contain Q-sequents and Q-inference
rules.

Definition 5.8 An Q-sequent is a structure of the form:

Q; Nl, .. .,N,

+

MI,. ..,M, where

1. Ni is a dual modal expansion tree
2. Mi is a modal expansion tree

3. Q is a sound expansion tree

4. Q and

-

Nl A

... A

Nr V MI V

. ..V Ma comprise an MET-proof.

We shall say that the sequent:
Sh(Q); Sh(Nl), ...,Sh(N,) + Sh(Ml), ...,Sh(Ma)
is the L K M sequent associated with this Q-sequent.
For the purposes of this construction, consider L K M with the structural inference rules Thinning and Contraction, propositional inference rules V-IA, V-IS,
7-IA, 7-IS, and modal inference figures L-IA and L-IS.

We will assume that

sequents are multisets, negating the need for interchange. In the sequel, we will
refer to a world x as admissible in a Q-sequent if x does not appear in T associated
with that Q-sequent.
We can now define several Q-inference figures analogous to the L K M inference
figures listed above.

Definition 5.9 (The Q-analog Inference Figures)
Here, A and C are METs, and I' and O are sets of METs.
Q;A[w],I'

+

Q ; c [ w ] , ~ --+

O

o

V-IA,

Q;(AvC)[w],I' + O

Q;P[xI,C

+

Q; (LP +=P)[w],C
tNote that

ti

@
--+

8

Q,w RL X; C ---+ P[x],@
L-IA~~
Q ; c + LP[w],@

and x must be admissible.

L-IS,

Proposition 5.3 If the lower structure of the inference figures of definition 5.9 is
a Q-sequent, the upper structure is a Q-sequent.
Proof:
First, observe that modal expansion trees and dual modal expansion
trees are preserved under the structural changes given in the inference
rules. If the imbedding relation was acyclic in the lower Q-sequent, it is
in the upper Q-sequent. Moreover, in each case, Q is unchanged, or has
an unquantified atom attached via a conjunct. These changes sustain
Q's status as a sound expansion tree.
Lastly, for the propositional rules it is straightforward to verify that the
tautologous nature of the deep forms holds. It remains to shown that
the tautology condition is preserved by the modal inference figures.
For L-IS, note that Dp of the lower stucture is of the form

which is equivalent to

This is the deep form for the upper sequent.
For L-IA, the lower structure has the deep form:

which is tautologous iff

and

-

Dp(Q) 3- DP(@)v 5 V D P ( ~ )
are tautologous.
The latter is the deep form for the upper structure. Note that the former
statement corresponds to the proviso on L-IA, while the admissibility
condition corresponds to the proviso of L-IS.

4

We have now verified that the inference rules are properly defined. It is simple
to show that one of these inference rules is always applicable until the members of
the Q-sequent consist only of trivial trees. Merely observe that the propositional
rules are always applicable, and the acyclic nature of

< ensures that some deduction

term is always eliminable.
Notice that the tautologous nature of the deep form ensures that there must be
matching atoms in the expansion trees. That is, if we take S h of a leaf sequent
consisting of only trivial trees, then it must be derived from an L K M axiom soley
through applications of thinning.

Proposition 5.4 If M is a MET-proof for A, then there is a corresponding (cutfree) L K M proof for A.
Proof: Consider a Q-inference which has M at the root, and Q-sequents
consisting only of trivial trees at the leaves. For any rule but L-IA*,
replace the sequents by the S h form and drop the Q subscript. For
example, for V-IA we have

For L-IAo*, add the following proof segment:
Sh((Lp +" PI

. .)[w]),Sh(pi[ti]),S h ( r )

+

Sh((Lp+" p~...>[w]),Sh((Lp+~'pl
...)[ w]),Sh(I')
Sh((Lp +" pl .. .) [w]),Sh(I')

-+

Sh(@)
+

Sh(O)

L-IA
contract ion

Sh(O)

Finally, apply the appropriate Thinning's to the leaf sequents of the
partial L K M tree to derive L K M axioms. This final object will be an
L K M proof for A.

5.3

Automatic Generation of Natural Deduction Proofs

As an example of the use of MET proofs, and also as a (relative) completeness result
of the outline transformations, we will sketch how to convert an MET proof into a
natural deduction proof. The algorithm we will present is highly non-deterministic

and is only a starting point. There are several changes that could be incorporated to
both increase the efficiency of the process, and to make the proofs more "elegant".
The crux of the method used to generate natural deduction proofs from METs
is that, by associating a portion of the MET with each line of the proof, we can use
the information present to select outline transformations, and substitute the proper
generation and deduction terms where appropriate. To be completely formal in
our argument, we should redo Definition 4.1 to accomodate the MET associated
with each line. Then, we would need to add the MET manipulations to each of the
outline transforms. Most of these manipulations are straightforward, however, and
due to time and space restrictions will not be given. We shall instead provide a
purely informal account. The interested reader should consult [18] for the complete
account.
There are two fundamental results we need about proof outlines.

Proposition 5.5 If 0 is an outline which contains a non-atomic active lines, then
some outline transformation can be applied to 0.
Proof of this proposition rests on the fact that we can either eliminate a standard
connective, or (based the acyclic nature of < defined on the MET associated with
this line) apply a transformation for a modality.

Proposition 5.6 If 0 is an outline in which all active lines assert atoms, then
RulePl or RuleP2 can be applied to the outline for all lines needing justification.
Proof of this proposition is based on that fact that the deep formula would not
be tautologous is this were not the case.

In the ensuing discussion, we will assume we have a spanning mating for the
deep formula.
Proposition 5.7 If I is a proof line in 0, and no literal of the MET associated
with 1 is mated, then D-Thinning or P-thinning (whichever is appropriate) can be
applied and it will not interfere with the closure of 0.
Justification of this proposition is based on that fact that the paths of the seq u e n t ~associated with this outline do not use the literals in this particular formula.
Hence, it can be removed without changing the essential structure of the outline.

An algorithm for generating a natural deduction proof for a formula, given an
MET for that formula, is:
1. Initially set 0 := Oo

2. Apply P-Neg or D-Neg to any lines which assert top level negations.
3. Apply some outline transformation to 0
4. Apply D-thinning or P-thinning to any applicable proof line

5. If some active line is not atomic, go to step 2.
6. Apply RulePl or RuleP2 to all active sequents to close the outline.

The three preceding propositions assure the algorithm is correct and will always
yield a proof given an MET. We must, however, ensure it terminates. Such a proof
is based on the following observations:
1. Any application of a transformation from the base set reduces the complexity

of some line in the proof, deactivating that line in the process.
2. Any applications of a modality transformation to some line introduces at most
a finite set of lines.
3. Any application of a RuleP variant closes some line and removes a sequent.

Based on these observations, we see that the inner loop of the algorithm will
eventually terminate (if not, we would need have infinite formula, or and infinite
expansion tree, both of which are disallowed). The application of RuleP rules must
also terminate. Thus, the algorithm terminates.

5.4

Automatic Generation of MET-proofs

We will now explore some aspects of the actual generation of MET-proofs. The
generation will be based on proving the validity of Dp of the modal expansion tree
for some formula. It would be possible, of course, to use tableau methods as the
basis for generation. However, there are some reasons why first-order methods may
be appropriate. First, very efficient first-order theorem provers exist, and semantic

translations for numerous modal logics are first-order. Thus, it is time-efficient to
add a translator to the front end of a theorem prover, rather than develop a new
theorem prover. Second, it is not entirely clear that tableau methods are applicable
to first order modal theories, while there are translations which account for first
order modal logic. Thus, we will consider first-order methods. In particular, we
prove some properties about the search space for MET-proofs which enhance the
efficiency of the proving process.
We can view the search for an MET-proof as a two-stage process. First, construct an MET for the formula of interest and then search for a substitution which
makes deep structure tautologous under the constraints imposed by the possible
worlds relation, and has an acyclic imbedding relation. Practically, we use skolemization to encode the imbedding relation and use standard theorem provers to check
for validity of the translation of the shallow formula, giving us the proper instantiation for the selection and expansion arcs as a by-product. It is simple to convert
a skolemized tree to the structure we have defined.
The structure of the formulae which we are considering is fairly rigid. The
question arises as to whether we must examine the full search space in the course
of theorem proving. As it turns out, there are sound and complete heuristics for
pruning the search space. We will present those heuristics based on analysis of the
method of matings [2]. We will assume the reader has some familiarity with this
method.
To quickly summarize the process, a fist-order formula in nnf is tautologous if
and only if it has a mated pair of literals along every path in the formula.16 Paths
are defined over formulas in negation normal form, and correspond roughly to the
clauses of the formula in conjunctive normal form. A pair of atoms on a path is
mated if there is some substitution such that the atoms are made identical under
that substitution. By analysis of the paths of the deep formula, we will see that
there is an intelligent way to search for these matings.
16Rather than supply a formal definition, we refer the reader to the appendix, Section A, page 82
where the F'rolog theorem prover is listed. The definition of path in that code is essentially the
formal definition of path.

In the sequel, we will assume a unique labelling of the literals1' of a formula of
the form rl, r2, ...for relational atoms (r-literals in the sequel), and 11, 12, ... for other
atoms (p-literals in the sequel). We will also denote the set of paths for the deep
formula of an MET by ll. It will be convenient to distinguish between r-literals and
pliterals on paths, so we view paths a pairs of sets, e.g. ((rl, ... ,r,,),

(ll,. .. ,in)).

A mated pair will be a tuple (p1,p2) such that pl and p2 are complementary. A

mated pair (pl,p2) is a mating for a path (R, P ) if either R or P contains both pl
and pa. We will often refer to matings of r-literal as relational matings, and other
matings as propositional matings. A set of mated pairs is a spanning mating for a
set of paths if and only if each path has a mating from that set. For the purposes
of the following discussion, we will call a literal occurrence essential with respect
to a some mating if it appears as a member of a mated pair. FinalIy we will also
assume (for convenience sake) that all logics have both the positive and negative
sense of the modalities.

Definition 5.10 A modal formula containing both L and M modalities is in negation normal form (nnf) if the scope of each negation operator extends to only atomic
propositions.
Henceforth, we will only consider modal formulae in nnf. It is simple to show
that all propositional modal statements have an equivalent nnf. We immediately
observe the following:

Proposition 5.8 If A is a modal formula in nnf, and M is an MET for A, then
both 14 and Dp(M) are in first-order nnf (modulo rewrite of the newly introduced
implication signs).
Proof: We show by induction that the deep formula of an MET for a
formula in nnf results in a first order formula in nnf. The proof for is
similar and left for the reader.

If A is a literal or the negation of a literal then Dp(M) is in nnf.
If A is A1XI(A2then, by the induction hypothesis, Dp(MA,) and
Dp(MA,) are in nnf, hence so is Dp(M)
If A is L(A1),then Dp(MA)is x R, w > Dp(MA,)which rewrites to
x R, w v Dp(MA,). The negation extends only to a literal, and
Dp(MAt) is in nnf by hypothesis.

-

'
'
W
e

take a literal to be an atom, or the negation of an atom.

.

If A is M ( A 1 ) ,then Dp(MA) is (x R,wl A 6p(.M~,[wl])
V .. V
(x R, w, A & ( M ~ , [ W , ] )
which, by appealing to the induction hypothesis, is in nnf.

As we said at the beginning, there is a substantial amount of structure associated
with the deep formula of an MET in nnf. In order to expose this structure, we need
to define dominance as a relation between positive r-literals (which are associated
with deduction nodes) and literals.

Definition 5.11 We will say a positive r-literal, r, dominates another literal, I,
in an MET if the deduction arc associated with r occurs above the node or arc
associated with 1 in the MET. We will call a sequence of r-literals rl, rz, . . ,r, a
dominating chain of 1 in an MET if rl dominates I, ri dominates rj for i < j and
there is no positive r-literal which dominates I and does not appear in the chain.

.

By virtue of the special structure of the class of MET'S, we can state the following
fundament a1 proposit ion.

Proposition 5.9 If a path (R, P) E ll contains a literal dominated by an r-literal,
r, then there is a path (R1,P1) E TT. where:
R1 = R - {rllrlis dominated by r)

P1= P - {p'lp' is dominated by r)
We will often write (R, P) 4, (R', P') to denote this relationship between paths.

Proof:
This can easily be seen by looking at structure of the deep formula of
the MET. Positively occurring relation literals occur only in deduction
nodes. Thus, they are attached by a conjunctive operator when the
formula appears in nnf. Hence, when constructing paths for the deep
formula, there will be a bifurcation; half of the paths will contain the rliteral, and half will contain the path extensions generated by the subtree
conjoined to the r-literal.

Definition 5.12 Let 11° = {TI T

E II contains no positive r)

Proposition 5.10 For any modal formula, 11° # 8

Proof:
By the fact that MET'S are non-empty and finite, by repeated application of the Proposition 5.9 we can arrive at a path with no positive
r-literals.

4
It is easily seen that all elements of 11° are minimal with respect to 4.Another
simple consequence of 4 is the following:

Proposition 5.11 If T E ll contains a mated pair of pliterals, (11,12), then (11,12)
is a mating for all rrr' E ll such that rrr' 4 rrr.
Proof:
This is, again, a very simple result based on the fact that the rrr' differ only by the replacement of relation propositions with more literals.
Hence, if some mated pair was a mating for rrr, both members of that
4
pair appear in T' and hence that mated pair is a mating for T'. l8
Note the existence of 11° implies a result analogous to the standard result in
modal logic (e.g [ll]pg. 41) which states that the PC-transform of a modal theorem
is tautologous. These paths correspond to the propositional part of the formula. If
there is a spanning mating for II, then the only matings for these paths must be
propositional. Hence, the PC-transform is tautologous.
Also, note the following property of paths. If there are
T

+, rrr',

T

and rrr' in II where

and r dominates an essential literal in rrr, then the mating for rrr' must occur

within the relational portion of the path, or be an alternate propositional mating
for rrr by Proposition 5.11.
It is convenient to view the set of paths containing a dominating literal of some
member of 11° as a lattice-like struct~re.'~For the simplest case, referring to figure
5.4, assume we have one dominating r-literal, rl, in an MET. The lattice for this
tree has two elements. Assume there is a spanning mating for these paths. Then
the least element has a propositional mating. If this is not a mating for the greatest
element, then rl must dominate an essential literal. Note, since rl is the only
positive r-literal, it immediately follows that rl must be mated.
''This is, in fact, a particularization of a more general result stating that a mating for some path
is a mating for all paths which are extensions of the mated one.
lg They

are in fact a lattice, but we make no use of formal lattic properties here.

(. ..ll - l,,,

.. .)

Figure 3: A Simple Example of a Path Lattice

Figure 4: A More Complex Example of a Path Lattice

Suppose we have three relation literals, rl, r2, rs, which dominate sets of literals
L1, L2, L3 (see figure 5.4). Furthermore, suppose that there are only two possible
matings for the least element of the lattice. One mating uses only literals under
r2, and the other uses one literal dominated by rl, and one dominated by rs. If
we look at all immediate predecessors of the least element, they can all achieve
propositional matings. However, at the next level there is only one path which
could have a propositional mating. The greatest element must have a relational
mating. If r2 was the mated relation literal, then r2 and the propositional mating
under it would suffice as a spanning mating for the entire lattice.

If r2 is not mated, then look at the paths rl or rs. In each case, we can find
paths which, under the stated restrictions, force a mating for those literals. The
sum of these matings is, in fact, a spanning mating for the entire lattice.
We would like to generalize these ideas and formalize the notion that certain
r-literals are essential to a mating, and some are not. By doing this, we can examine
exactly what structure the essential r-literals have. Intuitively, when we view an

MET, it seems the only essential r-literals should be those that have some bearing
on the propositional mating. In the examples this was true; only dominating rliterals of the propositionally mated pairs were important. We will formalize this
by defining a strong mating.
Definition 5.13 A constraint set, C, for a path (R, P) and a positive r-literal r
dominating at least one literal in the path is defined as:

C

(r'lr' E R and r does not dominate r')

We will refer to the pair (r, C) a constraint of the path (R, P).
Definition 5.14 A literal, I, in a path

T

has satisfied constraints if:

1. The are no r-literals dominating I (in which case there are no constraints), or
2. For all r dominating I, r is identical to a negative occurrence in the associated
constraint set, and that literal has satisfied constraints.
Definition 5.15 A strong mating for a path, R E 11° is a mating, (11,12)for R such
that both l1 and l2 have satisfied constraints. A strong spanning mating is a strong

mating for all members of IT0.

A strong mating, then, consists of a propositional mating, matings for a dominating chain of the members of that propositional mating, and matings for members of
the dominating chains of all r-literals mated to members of some dominating chain.
We will now proceed to show that a strong spanning mating is a spanning mating,
and that a spanning mating must include a strong spanning mating.
Proposition 5.12 If T E no, and T 4, T', then r together with the negative
r-literals in w form a constraint with respect to all literals dominated by r.
Proof: Directly from the definition of 4 and constraint.

4

Proposition 5.13 If all matings for a path, T, depend on at least one member of
w, then at least one member of that subset has all constraints
some subset wt
satisfied.
Proof:
We will show by strong induction that some member of the selected set
must have all of its constraints satisfied.
The measure we will use is:
0 if some member of the set has no dominating r-literals.
the maximum, over all members of the set, of the highest number
of constraints which might need to be satisfied for that member.
1. If there are no dominating r-literals for some literal in w', then the
result is trivial; there are no constraints for that literal.

+

Suppose that there are n 1 constraints for some member. Consider the path (R1, PI) where all members of the specified set are
replaced by their immediately dominating r-literal as in Proposition 5.9. The only possible matings in this path must use these
new positive r-literals. Now, consider R1' c R1 consisting of all
negative r-literals which participate in a mating. Some member of
this set has 5 n constraints, and all matings depend on this set. By
the induction hypothesis, at least one member has all constraints
satisfied.
Now, consider Ry c R1 consisting of all positive r-literals participating in a mating with a r-literal having satisfied constraints and
negative r-literals with no satisfied constraints. All matings depend on this set, some member of this has 5 n constraints, and so

has satisfied constraints. Moreover, this member must be mated
to another r-literal with satisfied constraints, by the way R: was
constructed. Hence the original set has some member with satisfied
constraints.

Lemma 5.14 If some member of 11° has several matings in some spanning mating,
the constraints of both members of one of those mated pairs are mated in that
spanning mating.

Proof: Consider selecting one member of each mated pair and applying Proposition 5.13. At least one member of this set has satisfied
constraints. We can symmetrically do this with the other member of all
mated pairs. The question arises as to whether both members of some
mated pair have satisfied constraints. Suppose not. Then each mated
pair has at least one member which does not have satisfied constraints.
Take all members of mated pairs which are unsatisfied. This is a set to
which Proposition 5.13 can be applied, and hence some member must
have satisfied constraints. This is a contradiction. Our assumption must
have been wrong, and both members of some mated pair have satisfied
constraints in this path.
4
Proposition 5.15 If A has a spanning mating, then it has a strong spanning mating.
Proof: Every member of 11° has a mated pair in that spanning mating.
By the previous proposition, some mated pair in each of those paths has
satisfied constraints with respect to that path.

Proposition 5.16 In a path set II, A strong spanning mating for 11° of an METproof yields a spanning mating for II.
Proof: For some T E 11°,we can consider the set of paths {T' I T
4 T')
and show by induction on 4 that each path will contain a constraint.
It immediately follows that this path has a mating. Since all paths are
related in this way to some path in no,the result follows immediately
1. In the first case, all propositional paths are mated - there no constraints.

+

Assume w' occurs at height n 1. By the induction hypothesis,
there is a w 4" w" which contains the matched pair of some constraint, and w" + O,w'. There are three cases to consider:

If r was not part of the constraint in T", then the mating for
w" will suffice for w'.
If r, was mated in K", but r does not take part in the constraints
of the strong mating for T, then there must be other literals in
w" which do form a constraint, and these still form mating for

.

w'
Otherwise, the new literal, call it ro, is an essential dominator.
If its mate in the associated constraint is in this path, then
there is a mating for this path. However, it may have been previously subsumed. There must still be some constraint whose
the mated pair is in this set. Assume not. Then some positive
r-literal, rl, in this path dominates the mate for ro. Another
positive r-literal, r2 dominates the mate for rl (there must be
one since,-,r is part of a constraint and rl dominates it's mate).
If we continue this, we eventually get a cycle since there are
only a finite number of positive r-literals and, by assumption,
no mating. However, this implies the imbedding relationship
on the tree is cyclic, and hence there is no MET-proof. This
is a contradiction, so some constraint is satisfied in this path,
and hence the path is mated.

These results do not take into consideration the possible worlds theory. However,
they extend directly. First, we can extend Definition 5.14 by adding the following:
3. For all r dominating 1, r is in the x-closure of the associated
constraint set for the possible worlds theory x, and all literals upon
which the mate for r depends have satisfied constraints.

In other words, if we require transitive closure over some set of literals to get a
mated pair, all the literals used in the transitive deduction have satisfied constraints.
For reflexivity, our result still holds, since reflexivity adds one literal to a path which,
if mated, adds no further constraints. Hence, spanning matings and strong spanning
mating are still equivalent. Symmetry is similar.

The result also holds for transitivity, though it is more difficult to see. Transitivity essentially forces paths to triplicate, and adds a positive r-literal to two and a
negative r-literal to one of the triplicates. We have to make the alIowance that if a
transitivity is used, we consider the two alternate paths where the positive r-literals
are mated. We put their mates in a set with all other negative r-literals and see
that either they have satisfied constraints, or some other literal not depending on
transitivity has satisfied constraints. We leave the formal proof for the reader.
By virtue of the results we have obtained, we can now imagine constructing a
theorem prover using the following algorithm.
1. Find a mating for 11° of an MET
2. For each path in 11°, attempt to satisfy the constraints for some mated pair

in that path.
This means that we do a standard matching process interleaved with some procedural code for checking membership in the x-closure of constraint sets. Moreover,
there is substantial flexibility in the interaction between searching for matings and
strong matings. This method, then, appears to offer more flexibility than standard
tableau methods, and also allows construction of MET'S
Lastly, this allows use to define a concise version of modal expansion trees. First,
we need the following result:

Lemma 5.17 If the restrictions on the accessibility relation are 3V, then if Q :=
Q13 Q2is an expansion tree for Ro 3 a and <Q, is acyclic, then <Q is acyclic.
This lemma essentially observes that, under certain restrictions, the selection
and expansion variables in the "semanticn portion of the tree are not important in
the analysis of the imbedding relation.

Proof:
We will prove the contrapositive form of the statement. So, assume that
<Q is cyclic. Then there are x and y in S Q and OQ such that x < Q y and
y <Q x. Thus, a deduction arc labelled with x dominates a generation
arc labelled with y and a deduction arc labelled with y dominates a
generation arc labelled with x . But, in the semantic portion of the tree,

selection arcs dominate expansion arcs, but not vice-versa. Hence, the
cyclic portion of the relation must occur somewhere within the body of
the translated formula. Therefore, <Q, is cyclic.
d
Thus, we need only consider the MET's imbedding relation. In view of this and
the previous results on matings, we can restate the definition of MET proofs as:

Definition 5.16 An MET M of A is an MET, proof for A if
1. The theory of x if 3V

2. < M is acyclic,
3. The free variable of M does not appear generated in M.

4. The MET has a strong spanning mating with respect to theory x.
The last condition is the slight strengthening of the notion of tautology we need
to make the definition work. In some sense it may seem to be "overspecifying."
Standard ET's merely state that the deep formula is tautologous - a truth functional
definitional divorced from any procedure. Our condition presupposes a particular
procedure for search. However, it seems we need a notion of what p-literals are
needed for the proof in order to state a condition like tautology for MET's.

Conclusions and Future Research
The thrust of this research has been the formalization of a modal proof theory which
is concise yet analytical (or compositional) in nature. The lack (to our knowledge)
of other endeavors in this areas has forced our treatment in this thesis has to be
necessarily broad. However, it appears that this method is a useful vehicle for
generating proofs which yield more intuition of the underlying semantic structure
of a formula.
We developed a formal base for theses systems by defining the LKM family.
From this we moved to the method of outlines. This yielded a formalism which
had a computational nature, and was suitable for implementation of systems with
human interaction. Finally, MET'S have the promise of providing a "franca lingua"
from which proofs in other systems can be generated.
There are, of course, several questions left open by this thesis. Foremost among
these is the question of the power, generality and extensibility of such systems. In
particular, there what class of languages this approach is sufficient for. For instance,
we have investigated a temporal modal language due to Mays [16]. However, at the
time of this writing we do not have the soundness proofs of a Gentzen system for
this logic. It appears that the a Gentzen system of this form is constructible, and
that proof representation and theorem proving along the lines presented this thesis
is doable.
The use of outlines and possible automatic generation of Suppes style proofs
based on outlines is different approach than is typically seen in automated theorem
proving. This style of proof is quite amenable to machine implementation and
interaction than standard proof theory. It is arguable that tableau methods are
sufficient methods for computer implementation, however a tableau refutation does
not (explicitly) return an explanation of the proof. The impetus of the method of
outlines is to demonstrate the validity of a formula rather than just answer "yes" or
"no." This, in turn, could lead to natural language front ends which take a proof
and generate an explanation or interact with the user.
There are also the computational issues of designing an outline based proof
editor which can accomodate many flavors of modal logic by simple changing of

the transform rules and attached semantic procedures. It is possible to envision an
MACSYMA or LCF type of system as a tool for logicians based on this method.
The treatment of METs was mostly proof of existance and correctness. There
are several questions relating to whether this structure, when extended to the first
order case, could be considered a Herbrand type of result for modal logic. We have
some initial intuitions along these lines, and it appears that issues of quantification
which historically have been difficult to deal with become much clearer in this
formalism.
The extended notion of matings presented at the end of chapter 5 seems to offer
some interesting new avenues into modal theorem proving. The theory presented
there attempts a propositional mating which must then satisfy other "higher order"
constraints. However, one can turn the search around and satisfy the relational constraints first. Which way to go is largely a heuristic question - tableau provers being
only one point on this spectrum. Moreover, we have started to look at intutionistic
logic and its translation to S4. It may be possible to construct a method of matings
for intuitionistic logic aIong these lines.
It appears that tableau methods could be used to generate MET'S. (We can
in fact show that L K M proofs are constructible from tableau refutations). Since
tableau methods are the most highly developed computational methods for modal
logic, this connect ion certainly worth investigating.
More than anything, however, the concept of different proof representations and
their inter-relationship needs more exploration. In some sense all proof methods
are related, though specific methods are tailored toward different purposes. It is
of the utmost utility to be able to unify divergent methods and translate between
them. This thesis is a beginning toward this unification.

A

Implementation Status

A.l

A Natural Deduction Editor

The preceding formalism for generation of natural deduction proofs has been implemented as an interactive outline editor written in prolog. The language is a first
order modal logic in which the Barcan formula and it's converse are valid (i.e the
domain of all worlds is identical) and all identifiers are rigid. This section presents
an overview of the data structures and implementation.
By definition 4.1, a line is a 4-tuple. In prolog, a line is a 5-place term where
the fifth member is the world ornamenting the formula. Similarly, a 3-place term
containing a list supporting lines, a sponsoring line, and the accessibility relation
information. A proof outline is, then, a tuple consisting an (ordered) list of lines,
and a list of sequents.
Outline transformations are functions from an outline to another outline. To
facilitate definition of these functions, a transform language was defined, and a
compiler written which translated the transform language to prolog rules. The
compiled rules are a relation between the outline, the lines to be transformed, and
the new outline resulting from the transformation. The rule fails if some proviso of
the outline transform is not satisfied.

Example A.l The following is an example of a transform rule
d-disj iss (

sponsor(H I - C).
support (Hi 1 - A

B)

.

add(Line1, [Linei] I - A,stwl ,hyp) ,
add(Line2,[LineilH] I - C,sw,NJ).
add(Line3, [Line31 I B stwl .hyp)
add(Line4,[Line3IHl I - Cssw,NJ1),

-

.

.

The reserved words sw and stwl designate the free world in the sponsoring line,

and the first supporting line respectively. The reserved word re1 designates the
relation information in the sequent associated with the sponsoring line.
Proofs can be finished using either the supplied rulepl or rulepa rules, or
rulep. In the case of rulep, a simple theorem prover is used to verify the validity

of the formula.
In order to make such a system usable, a number of addition facilities must be
available. This section is a quick and cursory summary of the commands available
in the current natural deduction system. This appendix also contains scripts of
some example sessions.

A.l.l

Proof Processing Commands

This set of commands can be used to transform old proof outlines into new proof
outlines. All transform rules are identified by name. Information required by them
(e.g. line numbers, variables) is prompted for automatically. New worlds are of the
form wn, and variables are of the form vn where n is some integer. The current
transforms with the proof environment are:
rulep
pruled
d-always
d-con j
d-neg I
d-thinning

rulepl
druled
p-always
d-dis j
d-neg2
d-all

rulep2

d-imp
d-neg3
d-exist s

Two special rules which need some explanation are pruled and druled. These
are special transforms for introducing definitions into the proof. They prompt for
a predicate and generate a new line by replacing (preserving variable bindings) all
instances of the predicate by its definition. Definitions are assumed to be in the
database in the form:

A.1.2

Informational Commands

The following commands are available for getting information on a proof currently
in progress.
Q

print - print the entire proof thus far.

Q

active - print only the active lines in the proof.

Q

sequents - Print the current sequents in the outline.

Q

outer

- Print

the outer operator of the line which the user supplies to the

prompt.
A.1.3

Utility Commands

These rules print information about the outline editor, and allow the user to save,
restore, backup, quit, or format a proof.
Q

rules - Print all the deduction rules available.

Q

save - write the proof lines to a file which is prompted for. This is different
than the dump command.

Q

dump - dump the proof to a file which is prompted for. This file can then
be the argument of a restore command, i.e. it save the entire state of the
proof.

Q

Q

Q

done - Quit working on the current proof.
tex - format the proof lines into tex.
restore

-

This command is typed to the prolog interpreter to restore a

previously dumped proof. The form is restore (<fname>).

A.1.4

Syntax

The following syntactic conventions are used in the examples.
a and is 8.

a implication is

->>.

is not.

a

a f oral1 (X ,F) is universal quantification.
a

e x i s t s (X ,F) is existential quantification.

a L is necessarily.
a

M is possibly.

Example Session

A.2
A.2.1

A Proof of the S4 Axiom20

?- prove(l(p) ->> l ( l ( p ) ) ) .

rulename: p-imp.
sponsor:

,.

rulename: p r i n t .
12

12 1 - l ( p ) i n wO

13

12 1 - l ( l ( p ) ) i n wO

11

hyp
,160

I - l ( p ) - > > l ( l ( p ) ) i n wO

deduct(l3)

rulename: p-always.
sponsor:

,.

world? w1.
"This is the session used to generate the natural deduction proof of example 4.1.

76

rulename: p-always.
sponsor:

,.

world? w2.
rulename: print.
12 12 1 - l(p) in wO
16 12 1 - p in w2

hyp

,770

14 12 1 - l(p) in wl 1-is
13 12 1 - l(l(p))
inwO 1-is
11
I - l(p)->>l(l(p))
rulename: d-always.
supporti: ,.

in wO

deduct(l3)

world? w2.
rulename: print.
12 12 1 - l(p) in wO

hyp

16 12

1 - p in w2

1-ia

15 12

I-

,770

p in w2

14 12 1 - l(p) in w1
13 12 1 - l(l(p))
11

1-is

inwO

I - l(p->>l(l(p))

1-is

in wO

rulename: tex.
where? 'papers/example.tex'.
rulename: sequents.

rulename: rulep2.
sponsor: ,.
supportl: ,.

The proof is:

deduct(l3)

12

12

16 12

11-

p in w2

12 1 - p in w2

16

hyp

l(p) in wO

1-ia
rulep(l6)

1 - l(p) in w1 1-is
13 12 1 - l(l(p)) in wO
1-is
14 12

I-

11

in wO

deduct(l3)

An Example Using Definitions

A.2.2

I

l(p)->>l(l(p))

?- assert (a df (b

c))

.

Yes

I

?- prove(a ->> a).

rulename: p-imp.
sponsor:

,.

rulename: druled.
supportl:

,.

Definition?a.
rulename: print.
12

12

I-

ainwO

14

12

bnc in wO

13

12

11-

11

I-

a in wO

a->>a in wO

hyp
def (12)
,161
deduct(l3)

rulename: pruled.
sponsor:

,.

Definition?a.
rulename: print.
12 12

I-

a inwO

hyp

14 12 1 - bnc in wO

def (12)

16 12 I - bnc in wO

,746

13 12 1 - a i n wO

I - a->>a i n

11

def (16)
wO

deduct(l3)

rulename: sequents.
; 14

1 - 16

rulename: rulep2.
sponsor: 16.
support1 : 14.
The proof i s :
12 12

I - a in

hyp

wO

14 12 1 - b-c i n wO
16 12

1 - bAc i n

wO

13 12 1 - a i n wO

I - a->>a i n

11

A.3

def (12)
rulep(14)
def (16)

wO

deduct(l3)

Generating Modal Expansion Trees

The theory discussed in Chapter 5 has been implemented in the form of a Prolog
program. This section presents the code for that theorem prover and an example
run. This particular implementation is not complete since deduction nodes in trees
are limited to a single outgoing arc. Also, the definitions of some predicates such
as member have been omitted.

/*

This s e t of predicates converts to modal NNF */

nnf ((- (A
B)),
nnf ( ( - (A & B))
n.nf("(" A), B)
n.nf(l(A),l(B))
nnf (m(A) .m(B))

(A1 & A211 :- nnf ((" A) ,All ,nnf ((' B) ,A2).
A2)) : - nnf ((' A) ,A11 , ~ f ( ( - B) sA2) : - nnf(A,B).
:- nnf (A,B).
:- nnf(A.B).

, (A1

1(A) ,m(B)) :- nnf('A,B).
nnf(- m(A),l(B))
: - nni('A,B).
nnf(-(A -> B) , ( A1 & Bl)) :- nnf(A.Ai),nnf(('
B)sB1).
&('A
<-> B),C) :- nnf(('(A
-> B)) ^ B('(
-> A)),C).
d ( ( A ^ B), (A1 B1)) :- mf(A.A1), nnf(~,~l).
nni((A & B) , (A1 & Bl)) :- nnf(A,Al),nnf(B,Bl).
d ( ( A -> B) , ( A1 ^ Bl)) :- d('
A.Al).nnf(~,~l).
&((A
<-> B) ,C) :- nni((A -> B) k (B -> A),C).
nnf(A,A) :- atom(A1.
nnf ("A, 'A) :- atom(A) .
nnf('

/* An MET is a pair of a tree and a free variable for that tree. This set
of predicates builds skolemized METs. */

expansion(l(A1 ,gen(Y ,L) ,-,even,DV) :synskfn (DV ,Y) ,
expansion(A ,L,Y ,even,DV)
expansion(m(A),ded([~X,Lll).~,even,DV) : expansion(A ,L,X ,even. [X IDV1 ) .

.

expansion(A -> B,L1 -> L2,Xseven,DV) : expansion(A.Ll .X,odd,DV)
expansion(BSL2,X,even.DV).
expansion(A <-> B,L1 <-> L2,X,even,DV) :expansion(A -> B ,L1,X,even.DV),
expansion(B -> A, L2 , X , even ,DV) .
expansion(A & B.Ll & L2,X,even,DV) :expansion(A ,L1,X even,DV)
expansion(B ,L2,X ,even,DV) .
expansion(A ^ B.Ll
LZ,X,even,DV) : expansion(A ,Ll X ,even,DV) ,
expansion(B,L2,X,even,DV).
expansion(' A, -L,X,even,DV)
:- expansion(A,L ,X,odd.DV) .

.

.

.

.

expansion(A -> B,L1 -> L2,X,oddSDV) :expansion(A Ll X even,DV) ,
expansion(B L2.X ,odd,DV) .
expansion(A <-> B.L1 <-> L2,X,oddSDV) :expansion(A -> B,Ll,X,odd,DV),
expansion(B -> A.L2,X.odd,DV).
expansion(A & B,L1 & L2,XSodd,DV) :expansion(A ,L1.X ,odd,DV)
expansion(B .L2 .X,odd.DV) .
expansion(A a B,LI a L2,X,odd,DV) :expansion(A,Li,X,odd,DV),
expansion(B,L2 ,X,odd,DV).
expansion(" A .-L ,X.odd,DV)
:- expansion(A.L,X ,odd.DV).
expansion(A,A,-,,.-)
:- atom(A).

. ..
.

.

/*

An MET for a formula is the skolemized version of the tree for the
formula in nnf. */

/* label generates labels for everything in the tree, notes dominance
relationships, and builds an assoc list of literal names and the literals
themselves. The result is the collapsing of the tree to what corresponds to
the PC transform in this system. The connection between literals (which
are asserted into various structures in the database) and the atoms is
maintained through the assoc list. This allows us to use Prolog unification
to do the proper substitution during the theorem proving stage. Note we
need the occur check.

*/
label(~Tree,FV1,PCNewTree,PAlistsRAlist): FV = sk,
labell(Tree,FVs~,PCNewTree,PAlist,RAlist).

labell(gen(NFV,A),FV,Dom~rpair(X,~(N r NFV)) * B,PAlist,
[[X,'(FVrNFV)]IRAlistl)
:gensym (rlit ,X) ,
gendomrel(X ,Dom) ,
labell(A,NFV,Dom,B,PAlistDRAlist).
labeli(ded([[NFV,A]

lTI)nEVsDom,B C,PAlist,[[X,FV r NFV] IRAlistl) :T \== [I ,
gensym (rlit ,X) ,
assert(dominator(X) ) ,
gendomrel(X,Dom),
labell(A,NEV,X,B,PAlistlsRA1ist1),
label1(ded(T) ,FV,Dom,C,PAlist2 ,RAlist2),
append(PAlistl,PAlist2,PAlist),
append(RAlist1,RAlist2,RAlist).
a

labell(ded( [[NFV,All) ,FV,Dom,B,PAlist , C C r NFVI IRAlistl) :gensym(r1it ,X),
assert(dominator(X) ) ,
gendomrel(X ,Dom),
labell(A,NFV,X,B,PAlistsRAlist).

labell('

A,FV,Dom,pair(X," B),[[X,'

B]],[])
:atom(A) ,
gensym (plit ,X) ,
B =..[A,FVI,
gendomrel(X,Dom).

/* This asserts facts about the dominance relationship; the reason for the
var is just a handy way to handle the case where there is no dominator */

-

gendomrel(Node,Dominator) : var(Dominator) ;
nonvar (Dominator) ,assert(dom (Dominator,Node) ) .

/*

Do the pi zero paths split into pairs of plits and rlits. */

path(pair (L .PI,path( [I ,[pair(L .PI1 ) .
path(rpair(L,R) ,path( [rpair(L ,R)], [I 1).
hpaths(PCTree,Paths) :- bagof (Path,path (PCTree ,Path) .Paths).

/* The structure needed during the proof search is the labelled tree, the
paths, and the dominance relationships */

-

.

gen-struct (Tree,Paths,PAlist ,RAlist) :
label(Tree ,PC,PAlist,RAlist)
hpaths(PC ,Paths) ,
label-paths(Paths) .

/* Ok, some restaints stuff. In a path, if I mate this literal, what
else must be mated.

*/

dchain(Lit,Rel,[n)ominator,Rl] IR]) :dom (Dominator,Lit)
removedom(Rel,Dominator,R1),
dchain(Dominator.Rl ,R) ! .
dchain(,,,,
[I 1.

.

.

removedom(Set.Lit,Newset)

removedom( [I, ,
, [I) .

:- bagof(rpair(Lits,P),

(member(rpair(Lits,P) .Set).
\+dom(Lit.Lits)),
Newset).

/* Ok, here we go; the theorem proving algorithm. We mate a pair and then
try to mate the dominators ad infiniturn. Note the mutual recursion
If you mate some positive r-literal, you have to go satisfy its
dominating chain. */

--

-

simplemating(~ath,Lit1 ,Lit2) :
member (pair(Lit1,Atom) ,Path) ,
member(pair(Lit2,'
Atom),Path).

satisfy([] ,, [I 1.
satisfy( [[Lit ,Set] lR1 ,RAlist, [[Lit ,Rlit,her]
IRestI :assoc (Lit ,RAlist,Atom) ,
in(rpair (Rlit ,' Atom), Set) ,
satisfy(R,RAlist,Rest) ,
satisfydominators(R1it,SetsRAlist,Other).

/* Defining the closure conditions on the set

-- 56 doesn't

work without
more sophistication about marking. The structure returned contains
information on what closure rules were used, and what members of the
set were matched. */

/* So a mating of a propositional path is a simple mating plus satisfaction
of the extra constraints */
mate (path(R1its ,Flits),mating(Litl ,Mates1,Lit2,Mates21,RAlist) :simplemating(Plit8 ,Lit1,Lit2) ,
satisfydominators(Lit1 ,Rlits,RAlist,Matesl),
satisfydominators(~it2,Rlits,RAlist,Mates21.

/* A spanning mating is a mating for all paths. */
:- )
spanning-mating( [F I RI , [Fi I Rll ,t
mate(F ,F1,RAlist),
spanning-mating(R ,R1,RAlist .
spanning-mating( [I , [I ,-1

.

/*

Top level callable predicate. Given a tree, what is the mating showing it
tautologous. */

.

-

met (X ,M) : cleanup.gen,stmct (X ,Paths,PAlist ,RAlist
spanning-mating(Paths.M,RAlist .

cleanup :- abolish(dominator,1),abolish(dom,2),abolish~ppath,2~.

/*

In this case, any literal has only one occurrence, and I don't want it to
backtrack. In the general case, the cut has to go. */

-

assoc (X,List,Y) : member( [X,Y1,List), ! .

.

label-paths( [F IR] ) :- gensym (path,Y assert (ppath(Y ,F) ) ,label-paths(R) .
label-paths( [I ) .

/* Hacks to write better */
writemate([])
:- nl.
writemate ([mating(X ,Y,A,B)IRI) :- write (XI ,write( - '1 ,write(A) ,nl,
write('f or '1 ,write(X) ,write( ' : '1 ,nl,
writelist(Y) ,
write ( 'for ' ) ,write(A) .write( : '1 ,nl.
writelist(B) .

Example A.2

I

?- prove(p

-> p).

***************

The Tree

***************

I"p l i t l

plit2,skI

plit2 - plitl
for plit2:
for p l i tI :

In this case, there was a propositional mating, and there were no further constraints
on the propositions involved.

plit4 - plit3
for plit4:
for plit3:
rliti rlit2

[I

In this case, the mating of p l i t 3 with p l i t 4 induced the further constraint that two
relation literals would be mated - r l i t l and r l i t 2 as indicated. These correspond
to the r-literals synthesized from the generation and deduction node in the tree.
The empty list indicates that there were no constraints induced by this mating. If
there were, they would appear nested within the list.

no

I

?- a s s e r t (t)

.

[ded( [ [sk,' plit711)

A

plit8. sk]

plit8 - plit7
for plit8 :
for plit7 :
rlit4 ref lit [I

In this case, by changing to system T, we can prove L(p) > p. In this case mating
plit7 required the use of transitivity as denoted by the ref lit marker.

[ded( [ Csk6,- plitli] I)

piitia - piitii
for pliti2:

A

gen(sk4,gen(sk6 ,plit12)) ,sk]

for plitll:
r l i t 8 tlit ( r l i t 9 , r l i t 10)

[I

Finally, by going into S4, we can prove Lp > LLp. The tlit marker indicates
transitivity was used, and that it used r l i t 9 and r l i t 1 O from the constraint set.

B

Soundness Via First Order Translation

In this section, we present an alternate soundness proof based on the validity preserving properties of a first order translation of the formula. We will define the
-TRANSFORM
for converting a modal propositional statement into the appropriate
first-order non-modal expression. This transformation will encode a modal proposition, p, into a first-order predicate fi(w), where w signifies the world in which
w is true,i.e. p
ji(w). A modal expression of the form pp will be transformed into a first order (meta-language) statement expressing the semantics of
the (object level) modal statement in terms of the possible-worlds relation R, , i.e.
(XP.Xt.Vx.t R, x 2 Px)fi.
Lp

Definition B.1 The ---TRANSFORM of a formula, a! is:

where MT is defined by:
1. MT(p,n) := X ~ n . f i ( ~ nwhere
)
p is atomic
2. MT(-- p, n) := (XP.XXn.

-

Psn)MT(p,n)

3. MT(pl $ p2,n) := (XP~P~.XX~.P~X,
$ P ~ x , ) M T ( ~ I , ~ ) M T (where
~ ~ , ~$) is
any binary connective.

4. MT(pp, n) := (XP.XX,.VW,.X,R~W,
modality p

> Pwn)MT(p,n + 1) for any universal

5. MT(wp,n) := (AP.Xxn.3wn.xnRLwn/\ Pw,)MT(p, n
modality w

+ 1) for any existential

In the following, we will denote the --TRANSFORM
the ---TRANSFORM
of sets of formula, @, as 6.

of a formula, a, as &, and

Example B.l LLp > Lp
( V X ~ . W O RT,~ (XV~ X ~ . X ~>Rj~( ~X1~) 2
) VXO.WORLXO
3 ~(xo)
This approach also extends to first-order modal systems with or without the
Barcan formula or its converse. In this case we would simply add a rule which
quantifies the bound variable over the ---TRANSFORM of the matrix. For instance,
in the case where the Barcan and it's converse are valid, we would have:
MT(Vy a, n) := (XPAx,Vy Px,) M T ( a , n)
We would then have to establish the convention that the predicates are eztended by
one argument which must be a world.

Proposition B.l Definition B. 1 is validity preserving, i.e.
~ T , S ~ ,aS if
S
801
where 8 contains the axiomitization of the appropriate accessibility relation.
Correctness of various forms of semantic translation for satisfiability or validity
can be found in [9,4]. In this paper, we will rely on the fact that the --TRANSFORM is
validity preserving .
The basic procedure is to show that an LKM-proof of A can be converted to
an LK-proof of !Ro T, 2.

Proposition B.2 If A has a LKM proof, then !Ro

-

has an LK proof.

Proof:
1. For a tree of height 0, if
8;(p), -+ (p), is an axiom, then 8,MT(p, n)w ---, MT(p, n) w
can be converted to an axiom by repeated application of thinning.
2. For a tree of height n, we have the following cases:

If the last rule applied was a rule of propositional calculus, the
transformation simply of the form:
8;At
2
RuleX

-

8;A' +

z1

RuleX

These transform to2' :

.,

a,& + c1
and

x,A1

RuleX

--

E1

RuleX

%,A + M ~ ( a , n ) , e
The validity of the upper sequents follows from the induction
hypothesis.
For L-LA we have:
8;pwt,C

-+

8

L-IA

8;(Lp)w,E + 8
transforms to:
Given
-

8

+

RuleX

wRLwr

? R , M T ( ~ , ~ ) W ' , ~-+
"

f: + B

%, 8,wRLwr> M T ( ~n)wr,
,

?R,wRLwl> M T ( p , n ) w l , g

6

-+

B , V X . W R ~2XM T ( ~n)z,
, f:

,.,

V-IA

several thinnings

B

+

,., V-IA

8

By the proviso attached to LIA, we know that the left branch
closes. The upper sequent of the right branch is the --TRANSFORM of
the upper sequent of L-IA, and hence closes by the induction
hypothesis.
For L-IS we have:

% U { W R ~ W ' } ; -+
C p',,B

transforms to:

"We have used

6 to denote {MT(B,n)wl(B),E 8).

L-IS

The proof of the upper sequent follows from the induction hypothesis. The only detail is to ensure that V-IS is applicable.
However, it is easy to show by induction that any free variables
in the lower sequent must appear in R. Hence, by the proviso
on L-IS, V-IS is applicable.

In summary, we have shown that by application of the above transformation rules, we can convert an LKM proof to the corresponding LK
1
proof.
Proposition B.3 If FLKM A, then ELK No > 3.
Proof: Apply Proposition B.2 to the LKM proof. Apply > -IS to the
bottom sequent in that structure.
4
Proposition B.4 The LKM systems are sound.
Proof: By Proposition B.3, if we have an LKM proof of a,we have
an LK proof of &. Proposition B.l states that Definition B.l is validity
preserving. Hence,

C

Hilbert Systems for Modal Logic

Here we quickly present sound and complete Hilbert style formulations for the
classical and knowledge logics discussed above.

Definition C.1 (A Hilbert System for T. S4. and S5)
The system T consists of the axioms and inference rules of propositional calculus
with the addition of the axioms

and the rule of inference

If F H p then

Lp

The system S4 is T with the addition of the axiom

LLp 3 Lp
The system S5 is S4 with the addition of the axiom

M p 3 LMp
The following logic of knowledge is a slightly modified version of that appearing
in [28].

Definition C.2 (A Hilbert System for Modal Logics of Knowledge)
The basic system consists of the axioms and inference rules of propositional calculus
with the addition of the axioms

Ki(p 3 q ) 3 (Kip 3 Kiq)
and the rule of inference

If I-,

p then

Kip

For common knowledge we add the axiom:

An agent has positive introspection if the following axiom appears:

An agent has negative introspection if the following axiom appears:
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